Actual Innocence after Friedman v. Rehal: The Second Circuit Pursues a New Mechanism for Seeking Justice in Actual Innocence Cases by Kirshbaum, Jonathan M.
Pace Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 2 Examining New York State Law
Spring 2011
Article 4
April 2011
Actual Innocence after Friedman v. Rehal: The
Second Circuit Pursues a New Mechanism for
Seeking Justice in Actual Innocence Cases
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum
Center for Appellate Litigation
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, Actual Innocence after Friedman v. Rehal: The Second Circuit Pursues a New
Mechanism for Seeking Justice in Actual Innocence Cases, 31 Pace L. Rev. 627 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/4
 627 
Actual Innocence after Friedman 
v. Rehal: The Second Circuit 
Pursues a New Mechanism for 
Seeking Justice in Actual 
Innocence Cases 
 
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum* 
 
Introduction 
 
In the 1980s, a “moral panic” swept across the United 
States as a result of incendiary allegations of mass sexual 
abuse of children at schools and day care centers.1 “The media 
sensationalized these [cases], generating a national perception 
that sex rings were widespread and had infiltrated average 
communities.”2 Many scholars now believe, however, that these 
cases represented “a modern-day „witch hunt.‟”3 In fact, of the 
seventy-two convictions associated with these cases, almost all 
were later overturned.4 
At the height of this nationwide frenzy, Jesse Friedman 
and his father were accused of abusing several dozen young 
boys in computer classes that they taught in the basement of 
their home in Great Neck, New York.5 But there was no 
 
  *  The Author is a senior appellate counsel at the Center for Appellate 
Litigation where he is Co-Coordinator of the office‟s Federal Litigation Unit. 
He is also an adjunct assistant clinical professor at Brooklyn Law School. He 
writes about habeas corpus matters at habeascorpusblog.com. He would like 
to thank all of the members of Pace Law Review for their fine work in editing 
the Article. He would also like to thank his wife, Fuyu, for her patience and 
understanding as he worked on this Article. 
1. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing eight 
cases from around the country). 
2. Id. at 155 (citing Devil Worship: Exposing Satan’s Underground 
(Geraldo Rivera, NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 1988)). 
3. Id. at 156. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 146. 
1
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physical evidence of abuse.6 The accusations stemmed purely 
from information that detectives gathered in interviews with 
the victims.7 The methods used by the detectives to gain these 
admissions, however, have always been subject to question.8 
Now the “consensus within the social science community” is 
that aggressive investigatory techniques—similar to those used 
in the Friedman case—“can induce false reports.”9 Despite the 
questionable nature of the evidence, Jesse pled guilty to the 
abuse.10 
Many years after the conviction, an extraordinary series of 
events occurred that resulted in the Nassau County district 
attorney‟s office agreeing to re-investigate the case. The chain 
reaction began with the production of the critically-acclaimed 
documentary Capturing the Friedmans.11 The movie depicts the 
accusations of abuse, the ensuing investigations, the impact of 
the case on the Friedman family, the children who were the 
focus of the allegations, and the Great Neck community.12 
Based on information he learned in the movie, Jesse raised 
claims in state court and then in a habeas corpus petition in 
federal court seeking to vacate the conviction.13 Each legal 
challenge was unsuccessful.14 Nevertheless, in a remarkable 
opinion, the Second Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of 
the facts and circumstances in Jesse‟s case, focusing on the 
question of actual innocence.15 The court believed that “new 
and material evidence”16 in Jesse‟s case established a 
“reasonable likelihood”17 that an “injustice”18 may have 
 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. at 156-58. 
9. Id. at 160. 
10. Id. at 145. 
11. CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO 2003) [hereinafter CAPTURING 
MOVIE]. 
12. See Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, 2008 WL 89625 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 4, 2008). 
13. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. 
14. Id. at 151-52. 
15. Id. at 152. 
16. Id. at 160. 
17. Id. at 159. 
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occurred. For this reason, it urged the prosecutor to 
reinvestigate the case.19 Within days of the decision, the 
prosecutor agreed to follow this extraordinary request. 
Since the dawn of the DNA testing era, actual innocence 
cases have captured the attention of both the legal community 
and our society at large. But most cases—like Jesse‟s—do not 
present the potential for DNA testing.20 It is certain, however, 
that a real percentage of these defendants have been 
wrongfully convicted.21 In an era where society has come face to 
face with the indisputable reality that there are people in 
prison (including people on death row) who are innocent,22 it 
should not be acceptable that actually innocent prisoners have 
to suffer the punishment of a wrongful conviction simply 
because they are not lucky enough to have a case that involved 
forensic evidence susceptible to DNA testing.23 
In calling for the reinvestigation, the Second Circuit in 
Friedman took a novel and creative approach to address the 
vexing problems posed by wrongful convictions. More 
important, the manner in which the court approached the 
question of innocence and called for a reinvestigation 
 
18. Id. at 161. 
19. Id. at 160. 
20. Brandon Segal, Comment, Habeas Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and 
AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway Standard 
for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully 
Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225, 225 (2008) (“[T]he number of 
exonerations of the wrongfully convicted can only be a fraction of the actually 
innocent, because most exonerations are DNA-based and many crimes do not 
have exonerating DNA evidence.”) (citing Stuart Taylor, Jr., Innocents in 
Prison: Many Thousands of Wrongly Convicted People are Rotting in Prisons 
and Jails Around the Country, NAT‟L ASS‟N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Aug. 6, 2007), 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/innocence138); Sarah A. 
Mourer, Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1279, 1286-87 (2010). 
21. Mourer, supra note 20, at 1282-84. See also infra notes 121-24 and 
accompanying text. 
22. David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-
Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027 (citing studies that show 340 post-
conviction exonerations between 1989 and 2003, with 251 due to DNA 
evidence alone). 
23. Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy 
of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 143 (2005). 
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represents the real innovation in the decision. Despite the fact 
that the underlying legal claim was procedurally defective and 
substantively meritless, the court took it upon itself to consider 
the question of actual innocence. Rather than analyzing the 
factual allegations through one of the actual innocence theories 
currently in existence, it addressed the question of innocence in 
a novel manner and directly linked this analysis to its call for a 
reinvestigation of the case. In doing so, the court created a new 
mechanism for federal courts to use when they believe that 
there may have been an injustice—namely, a call for a 
reinvestigation based on “new and material evidence” 
establishing a “reasonable likelihood” that a habeas petitioner 
is actually innocent. 
Part II of this Article will review the Second Circuit‟s 
decision in Friedman, explaining the background of the case 
and discussing the court‟s opinion. Part III will review the 
court‟s analysis in Friedman and show that the court‟s focus on 
actual innocence and its call for a reinvestigation were 
justified. Part IV will survey the newly developed freestanding 
actual innocence claim under the New York State Constitution 
and show that the claim, while important, does not render 
superfluous the need for courts to call for a reinvestigation in 
appropriate cases. Finally, Part V will show why the Second 
Circuit‟s analysis on the actual innocence issue was a novel 
approach and will breakdown the mechanism that the court 
used to provide guidance on how it can be followed in future 
cases. 
 
I.  Friedman v. Rehal 
 
In 1982, Arnold Friedman, a retired school teacher, began 
teaching computer classes to children in the basement of his 
family‟s house.24 In 1984, when Jesse was fifteen years old, he 
began to assist his father in teaching the classes.25 
In 1987, customs agents “intercepted a package containing 
 
24. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146. 
25. Id. Jesse assisted his father up until he left for college in September 
1987. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/4
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child pornography addressed to Arnold.”26 Federal agents 
searched the Friedman home and discovered additional child 
pornography hidden in a desk and behind a piano in the 
basement.27 The agents also found a list of eighty-one students 
who were enrolled in the computer classes and provided these 
names to the Nassau County Police Department.28 The 
department‟s Sex Crime Unit “sent out two-detective teams to 
interview [the] students.”29 
The tactics that the detectives used when interviewing the 
students became a central focus of the case. Some former 
students and their parents reported that detectives utilized 
“aggressive and suggestive questioning techniques to gain 
statements from children.”30 Detectives would allegedly reward 
children who admitted abuse.31 If a child denied abuse, the 
detectives would repeatedly visit the child and conduct lengthy 
and overly aggressive follow-up interviews until the child 
admitted abuse.32 A secretly videotaped interview with a 
former student, Gary Meyers, demonstrated these “hostile” 
techniques.33 The videotape showed that, throughout the 
 
26. Id. 
27. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 9:49-9:56 & 10:42-10:48. 
28. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. For example, in an affirmation, one former student reported that 
the officers made “specific suggestions [as to what] they believed happened in 
the computer classes.” Id. at 147 (quoting Brian Tilker Aff. ¶ 5). The 
detectives told him that other students had stated that they had been abused. 
Id. The detectives stated that they were certain that he had been abused and 
advised him that he should admit it. Id. A detective who had conducted many 
of the interviews explained in an interview with the film-makers that, in the 
interviews with the children, the detectives would tell them that they knew 
“there was a good chance that . . . somebody in that family touched you in a 
very inappropriate way.” Id. (quoting transcript of interview with Detective 
Squeglia). 
31. Id. at 147. 
32. Id. at 146-47. 
33. Id. at 147. The Friedmans became aware of this videotape during the 
criminal case itself and provided it to Jesse‟s lawyer. Id. The attorney 
confronted the prosecutor with the videotape and requested that he provide 
the defense with any other evidence of these “hostile” techniques. Id. Nothing 
was ever turned over. Id. 
5
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interview, the detectives “pressured” Meyers to admit abuse.34 
When he persistently maintained that he was not abused, the 
detective told Meyers‟ mother that he did not “like his answers” 
and referred to Meyers as a “wise guy.”35 
As a result of the interviews, Arnold and Jesse were 
arrested on a felony complaint alleging child sexual abuse.36 
Between December 1987 and December 1988, three separate 
indictments were filed charging Jesse with over two hundred 
counts of child sexual abuse.37 Despite the great number of 
charges, there was no physical evidence of abuse.38 In fact, no 
student had ever complained of abuse prior to the 
investigation.39 As the case proceeded, however, the allegations 
against the Friedmans “grew increasingly bizarre, sadistic, and 
even logistically implausible.”40 
Due to the nature and extent of the sexual abuse 
allegations, “the community [was] in an „uproar.‟”41 The case 
received a tremendous amount of media attention in the New 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Friedman v. Rehal, 
No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 3 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007). 
36. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146. 
37. Id. at 146. In addition, as the case expanded, the prosecution began 
to speculate that the Friedmans and other local teenagers had been operating 
a “sex ring.” Id. at 148. One of the teenage suspects, Ross Goldstein, 
eventually pled guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, even though 
more than half of the charges were alleged to have taken place before Jesse 
and Goldstein had ever met. Id. Goldstein later stated that he had falsely 
implicated others. Id. 
38. Id. In the movie, the prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Joe 
Onorato, stated that “there was a dearth of physical evidence.” CAPTURING 
MOVIE, supra note 11, at 33:43-33:54. 
39. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146. 
40. Id. at 147-48. In the movie, an anonymous student described a group 
molestation game called “Leap Frog,” in which Jesse would leap frog from one 
student to the next inserting his penis into their anuses. CAPTURING MOVIE, 
supra note 11, at 29:40-30:29. 
41. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 148 (alteration in original) (citing Richard 
Tilker Aff. ¶ 10). Hundred of parents attended community meetings to 
discuss the allegations. Id. The town defined itself as a “victimized 
community,” and those parents and children who denied that the abuse 
occurred no longer “fit in.” Id. (citing CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 
35:26-36:01). 
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York newspapers.42 As a result of the “media frenzy” over the 
explosive nature of the charges, the judge presiding over the 
case, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Abbey Boklan, 
allowed video cameras in the courtroom for the first time in 
Nassau County history.43 Notwithstanding the charged 
atmosphere, the judge denied Jesse‟s request for a change of 
venue.44 
On March 25, 1988, Arnold Friedman pled guilty to forty-
two counts of child sexual abuse and was sentenced to an 
aggregate sentence of ten to thirty years in prison.45 He pled 
guilty “at least in part because he believed [Jesse] would have a 
better chance at a fair trial that way.”46 
After his father‟s guilty plea, Jesse, now nineteen years 
old, claimed to have felt “enormous pressure” to plead guilty.47 
According to Jesse‟s attorney, Justice Boklan expressly 
informed Jesse‟s attorney that, if Jesse was convicted after 
trial, she intended to impose consecutive sentences.48 In 
response to the threat and out of a fear that he might spend 
most of his life in prison, Jesse advised his attorney that he 
 
42. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 148. 
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44. Id. at 149. 
45. Id.; Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 4 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2007). Arnold Friedman also pled guilty in federal court to sending 
child pornography through the mail. Leonard Buder, A Pornographer Given 
10 Years By a U.S. Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988. He was sentenced to 10 
years in prison. Id. It was also discussed in the documentary that Arnold 
admitted that, when he was in his early forties, he had sexual contact with 
two young boys while at his summer home. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, 
at 1:11:20-1:13:50.   
46. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149. In the documentary, Arnold stated in a 
home movie filmed right before the plea that this was one of his reasons for 
pleading guilty. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 1:11:04-1:11:10; see also 
id. at 1:00:47-1:01:14 & 1:02:14-1:02:18. After the guilty plea, however, 
Arnold was pressured to admit to the police that he had abused eighty 
children. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149. Soon afterwards, Newsday leaked 
Arnold‟s admissions. Id.; see also Alvin E. Bessent, Teen Faces 37 New Sex 
Charges, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1988. 
47. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149. 
48. Id. The judge made this threat apparently before she had seen any of 
the evidence against Jesse. Id. In the movie, Justice Boklan stated that 
“[t]here was never a doubt in [her] mind” as to Jesse‟s guilt. Id. (citing 
CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 31:28-31:32). 
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wished to plead guilty.49 
On December 20, 1988, Jesse pled guilty to seventeen 
counts of sodomy in the first degree, four counts of sexual 
abuse in the first degree, and other lesser counts.50 On January 
24, 1989, Jesse was sentenced to an aggregate term of six to 
eighteen years in prison.51 
In 1990, Arnold and Jesse both signed an “Open Letter,” 
that challenged the tactics that the police used to obtain 
admissions from the children.52 Throughout the letter, they 
alleged that detectives “grilled, coerced, pressured, lied to, and 
victimized children to encourage them to falsely accuse” the 
Friedmans of wrongdoing.53 
After spending thirteen years in prison, Jesse was released 
on parole in December 2001.54 In 2000, “documentary 
filmmaker Andrew Jarecki began investigating the Friedman 
case for a possible film. Jarecki interviewed members of the 
Friedman family, many of the former . . . students” and their 
 
49. Id. at 150 (quoting Panaro Aff. ¶ 12). The Second Circuit criticized 
Jesse‟s attorney for requiring Jesse to admit his guilt directly to the attorney 
before he would allow him to plead guilty. See id. In a footnote, the court 
stated that the attorney‟s actions could not be reconciled with both the 
federal and New York State Constitutions, which allow a defendant to plead 
guilty without explicitly admitting his guilt so long as the plea itself is 
knowing and voluntary. Id. at 150 n.1 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) and People v. Serrano, 206 N.E.2d 330, 333 (N.Y. 
1965)). 
50. Id. at 150. Both the district court and the Second Circuit refer to 
December 20th—the date of the guilty plea—as the judgment date. Id. at 151; 
Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 5. However, under New York 
law, the judgment date is the sentencing date, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
1.20(15) (McKinney 2003), here, January 24, 1989. Friedman, No. 06-CV-
3136, interim order at 7. 
51. Alvin E. Bessent, Teen Gets 6-18 Years for Child Sex Abuse, 
NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1989, at 35. At sentencing, both Jesse and his attorney 
claimed that Arnold sexually abused him as a child. Id. Soon after the guilty 
plea, Jesse gave a televised interview with Geraldo Rivera in which he 
repeated his admission of guilt and reiterated that his father had abused 
him. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 150. 
52. Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 4-5. 
53. Id. at 5. 
54. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. Upon his release, Jesse was classified a 
level III “violent sexual predator” under the Sex Offender Registration Act. 
Id. 
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parents, law enforcement personnel, the judge, and attorneys 
involved in the case.55 “After a three-year investigation, Jarecki 
created Capturing the Friedmans . . . .”56 In the movie, an 
anonymous student, who was referred to in one of the 
indictments as “Gregory Doe,” claimed that he was subject to 
hypnosis prior to recalling abuse.57 Jesse viewed the film for 
the first time on January 10, 2003.58 
On January 7, 2004, Jesse moved to vacate the judgment 
of conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 
440.10(h).59 Jesse claimed that the movie brought to light three 
new pieces of evidence: (1) some eyewitnesses initially denied 
that petitioner sexually abused them; (2) “detectives used 
interrogation methods known for eliciting false accusations”; 
and (3) the hypnosis of at least one accuser before he made any 
accusations.60 Jesse “argued that, pursuant to Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), he was entitled to the disclosure 
of [this exonerating material] prior to the entry of his guilty 
plea.”61 Jesse did not raise an actual innocence claim. The 
Nassau County Court denied the motion62 and, on March 10, 
 
55. Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, 2008 WL 89625, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 4, 2008) (citations omitted). 
56. Id. One of the more compelling aspects of the film was the large 
number of home movies that the Friedman family provided to the film 
makers. These home movies provided a behind-the-scenes look at how the 
family members (which included Jesse‟s mom and two older brothers) 
struggled with the allegations and the criminal prosecution. 
57. Id. at 151; CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 1:20:11-1:21:00. Both 
the student‟s therapist, as well as the prosecutor, denied that any hypnosis 
was ever used. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. For his part, Jesse claimed that 
other evidence showed that hypnosis was used more broadly. Id. 
58. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. Jarecki allowed Jesse to view the 
underlying investigatory materials in July 2003. Id. The movie itself was 
released in theaters on May 30, 2003. Carol Strickland, A Family in Great 
Neck, and the Secret Life it Led, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003. 
59. Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *2. This section provides, in relevant 
part: “At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was 
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the 
ground that . . . (h) [t]he judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the 
defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.” N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(h) (McKinney 2011). 
60. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. The state court denied the claim on the merits, relying on United 
9
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2006, the New York Appellate Division denied Jesse‟s 
application for leave to appeal.63 
On June 23, 2006, Jesse filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.64 He asserted that his due process rights were violated 
based on the prosecution‟s failure to disclose the three 
categories of newly discovered evidence.65 On July 20, 2007, the 
district court concluded that the claims based on the first two 
types of evidence—the initial denials and the police 
interrogation techniques—were untimely under the one-year 
statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).66 On January 4, 2008, the district court 
held that the third claim based on the hypnosis was also 
untimely.67 However, the district court granted Jesse a 
certificate of appealability.68 
In an opinion written by District Judge Edward R. 
Korman, sitting by designation, the Second Circuit affirmed.69 
 
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), which held that the Brady rule does not 
apply to impeachment evidence in guilty plea context. Id. 
63. Id. Jesse also sought leave to appeal from the New York Court of 
Appeals, which was denied. Id. at 152 n.3. However, as the Second Circuit 
noted, Jesse had exhausted his remedies after leave was denied from the 
Appellate Division. Id. at 151. 
64. Id.; Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *1. 
65. Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2007). 
66. Id. at 2. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), a petitioner has one year from the date his conviction becomes final 
to file a petition for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). The statute does 
provide some exceptions, however, including situations where petitioner 
could not have previously learned the factual basis of the claim through the 
exercise of due diligence. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The district court concluded that 
Jesse was on notice of this type of evidence before the movie, as reflected in 
his lawyer‟s knowledge of the Meyer‟s videotape and the information 
contained in the Open Letter. Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 
10-11. 
67. Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *2-6. The court concluded that 
petitioner did not file his petition within one year of January 3, 2003, the 
date when he learned the factual basis for the claim. Id. at *7. 
68. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 152. In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner can 
only bring an appeal from a denial if either the district court or the circuit 
court grants a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. To obtain 
one, a petitioner must show a “substantial denial of a constitutional right.” 
Id. 
69. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 145, 161. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/4
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The court opened its opinion with a “lengthy discussion of the 
facts and circumstances”70 of the case, relying upon “the facts 
as alleged in the petition, as well as the affidavits and 
supporting materials, including the transcript used in . . . 
Capturing the Friedmans, and the memoranda of interviews 
taken in preparation for the film.”71 This discussion covered the 
facts as set forth above, but went one step further. In several 
instances, the court presented Jesse‟s allegations of police, 
prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct as accepted fact. For 
instance, the court flatly stated that, “[d]etectives generally 
entered an interview with a presumption that a child had been 
abused and refused to accept denials of abuse.”72 Similarly, the 
court stated, as true, that Justice Boklan had threatened 
consecutive sentences if Jesse went to trial and was convicted.73 
The court, however, provided no record citation for this factual 
assertion. Rather, it seems to have been a fact that Jesse‟s trial 
attorney alleged in his affirmation.74 The factual recitation 
served its intended purpose: it cannot be denied after reading 
 
70. Id. at 161 (internal quotations omitted). 
71. Id. at 145. In the end, the court limited the “new and material 
evidence” to the “post-conviction consensus within the social science 
community that [the] suggestive” techniques used here can induce false 
allegations. Id. at 160 (internal quotations omitted). 
72. Id. at 146. 
73. Id. at 149. In general, a guilty plea is rendered involuntary if a judge 
threatens the defendant that she will impose a far more severe sentence 
should the defendant reject the plea offer and proceed to trial. People v. 
Wilson, 666 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165-66 (App. Div. 1997) (guilty plea coerced where 
judge promised to impose sentence almost four times greater than the plea 
offer); People v. Beverly, 528 N.Y.S.2d 450, 450 (App. Div. 1988) (guilty plea 
coerced where, prior to plea, court told defendant that if he went to trial, 
court probably would sentence him to “the maximum sentence, „on top of‟ the 
sentence for another crime”); People v. Christian, 527 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1020 
(App. Div. 1988) (“A defendant may not be induced to plead guilty by the 
threat of a heavier sentence if he decides to proceed to trial . . . .”); People v. 
Griffith, 435 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981) (guilty plea coerced 
by the trial court's “explicit threat of a heavier sentence should he choose to 
proceed to trial”). 
74. In the paragraph after the court discussed the threat, it focused on 
the impact of the threat. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 150. At that point, the court 
cited to trial counsel‟s affirmation. Id. Since there is no specific record 
citation for the threat, it is fair to deduce that the threat itself, supposedly 
made to trial counsel, was alleged in the same affirmation. 
11
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the compelling presentation that the Friedman case had every 
mark of a criminal investigation gone wrong. 
After setting forth the background of the case (without a 
specific focus on the actual legal claim raised), the court turned 
to the Brady claim.75 On appeal, Jesse only advanced the Brady 
claim relating to the evidence of hypnosis.76 As did the district 
court, the Second Circuit concluded that this claim was 
untimely because Jesse did not file his petition within one year 
of the date that he learned the factual predicate for the claim, 
namely when he first watched the movie.77 
After finding the petition untimely, the court first 
introduced the notion of “actual innocence” into the case.78 It 
noted that “[a] claim of actual innocence could provide a basis 
for excusing this late filing even though petitioner pled 
guilty.”79 The court decided, however, not to “resolve” this issue 
because it concluded that the underlying Brady claim had no 
merit.80 
The court did not end its opinion there. After it concluded 
that the claim was both procedurally defective and 
substantively meritless, the court took an extraordinary turn 
and “voic[ed] some concern regarding the process by which the 
petitioner‟s conviction was obtained.”81 The court then engaged 
in a lengthy analysis of what it viewed as serious problems 
with the evidence in Jesse‟s case.82 The court detailed the 
“[v]ast moral panic” surrounding large-scale child abuse 
allegations that engulfed the country in the late-1980s and 
 
75. Id. at 151. 
76. Id. at 152. 
77. Id. The court found that, once the time was tolled for the periods in 
which Jesse first sought relief in state court, the petition was filed three 
months late. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. (citing Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
80. Id. The court concluded that Ruiz barred relief, and, to the extent 
that the hypnosis could potentially be considered “exculpatory” Brady 
material, there was no clearly established Supreme Court precedent 
providing that Brady material must be turned over prior to a guilty plea. Id. 
at 153-55. 
81. Id. at 155. 
82. Id. at 155-62. 
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early-1990s.83 After discussing the many problems surrounding 
the interviewing techniques used to obtain evidence of abuse in 
these large-scale abuse cases,84 the court stated that, “viewed 
in its proper historical context, petitioner‟s case appears as 
merely one example of what was then a significant national 
trend.”85 It was a “heater case” where “the criminal process 
often fails.”86 The police appeared “unfazed by the lack of 
physical evidence” and “the prosecution allowed itself to get 
swept up in” the moral panic.87 
The court stated that Jesse had “come forward with 
substantial evidence that flawed interviewing techniques were 
used” to obtain a massive amount of allegations.88 Jesse “never 
had an opportunity to explore how the evidence against him 
was obtained.”89 To the contrary, all parties involved in the 
case put pressure on him to plead guilty and, based on the 
moral panic and the judge‟s admitted feelings on the case, the 
chances of a fair trial were slim.90 In contrast to cases where 
the court can “take comfort” in a verdict after trial, the 
“extraordinarily suspect” evidence in the case was “never 
subjected to vigorous cross-examination” or judged by a 
“properly instructed jury.”91 In this way, the court described 
Jesse‟s case as “unlike other appeals which raise concerns 
about the quality of the evidence and the guilt of the 
defendant.”92 
The court then focused on how a habeas court should 
 
83. Id. at 155. 
84. Id. at 156-57. 
85. Id. at 157-58. 
86. Id. at 158 (quoting Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the 
Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial and Due Process, 3 J.L. 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 293, 310 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=781585) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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proceed when faced with a claim of actual innocence.93 In 
framing its analysis, the court quoted from a seminal article by 
former Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, who opined that, 
in an “unusual case of the innocent man,” a habeas court 
should be more concerned about exercising its equitable power 
rather than feel “burdened by so much dross in the process.”94 
Nevertheless, the court noted that whether or not a free-
standing actual innocence claim under the federal Constitution 
“exists [remains] an open question” in the Supreme Court.95 
While the Court has assumed arguendo at times that such a 
claim may exist, it has “not[ed] the difficult questions such a 
right would pose and the high standard any claimant would 
have to meet.”96 
The Second Circuit stated that, even if it assumed that 
such a right existed and that Jesse could meet the high 
standard, the court could not reach the issue since the actual 
innocence claim was unexhausted.97 The court noted that Jesse 
may still have a remedy in state court as some New York State 
courts have concluded that an actual innocence claim may rely 
on the New York State Constitution.98 The court believed that 
 
93. See id. at 159. 
94. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148 (1970)). The full 
quotation contained in Friedman is: 
 
A remedy that produces no result in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, . . . an unjust one to the state in much of 
the exceedingly small minority, and a truly good one only 
rarely, would seem to need consideration with a view to 
caring for the unusual case of the innocent man without 
being burdened by so much dross in the process. 
 
 Id. (quoting Friendly, supra) (alteration omitted). 
95. Id. (citing Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 
129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009)). 
96. Id. (quoting Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
97. Id. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
unless it appears that: the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
98. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159 (citing cases). See infra notes 222-53 and 
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Jesse‟s case “may be one in which the New York courts may be 
particularly sympathetic . . . .”99 
Despite the legal impediment to relief, the court believed 
that it still had options to right the injustice. The court pointed 
to the district attorney‟s “continuing ethical obligation . . . to 
seek justice.”100 Relying upon a comment in the New York 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the court stated that 
prosecutors are required “to take reasonable remedial 
measures when it appears likely that an innocent person was 
wrongly convicted.”101 The comment provides further: “[W]hen 
a prosecutor comes to know of new and material evidence 
creating a reasonable likelihood that a person was wrongly 
convicted, the prosecutor should examine the evidence and 
undertake such further inquiry or investigation as may be 
necessary to determine whether the conviction was 
wrongful.”102 
The court stated that, under that standard, Jesse had 
provided “new and material evidence” that suggested a 
“reasonable likelihood” that he was wrongly convicted.103 The 
court emphasized that “[o]nly a reinvestigation of the 
underlying case or the development of a complete record in a 
collateral proceeding can provide a basis for determining 
whether petitioner‟s conviction should be set aside.”104 The 
court “hope[d]” that, even if the “current Nassau County 
District Attorney, who was not responsible for the investigation 
and prosecution of Jesse Friedman,” continued to oppose 
collateral relief, she would “undertake the kind of complete 
review of the underlying case” required under the ethical 
rules.105 
Remarkably, only three days after the opinion was issued, 
 
accompanying text. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. (quoting N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6B (2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
102. Id. (emphasis added). 
103. Id. at 159-60. 
104. Id. at 160. 
105. Id. 
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Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice agreed to 
reinvestigate the case.106 Ronald Kuby, one of Jesse‟s lawyers, 
summed up the decision best when he stated: 
 
 I‟ve never seen the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit criticize a district attorney‟s 
office and police practices with such 
vehemence—nor have I ever seen them so vocally 
advocate for a reexamination of a case, . . . . I‟ve 
lost a lot of cases in the Second Circuit, but I‟ve 
never lost one this well.107 
 
II.  The Second Circuit Was Justified In Using Its Equitable 
Powers to Call for a Reinvestigation of the Case Out of Its 
Concern that Jesse May Be Actually Innocent 
 
While truly remarkable, the Second Circuit‟s opinion in 
Friedman does raise some questions. The court engaged in a 
detailed analysis of the actual innocence claim even though it 
had concluded that the petition was procedurally defective, the 
underlying claim was meritless, and there was a legal bar to 
the court granting relief to the petitioner. Under such 
circumstances, it must be asked whether it was appropriate for 
the court to even consider the actual innocence claim.  
The appropriateness of the court‟s actions was not absent 
from the opinion itself. In fact, this question was expressly 
raised in the concurring opinion of Judge Rena Raggi.108 In her 
brief concurrence, Judge Raggi questioned whether the court 
 
106. See Andrew Keshner, Rice Picks Advisers for Review of Friedman 
Child Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 2010, at 1. At the time of the 
announcement, Rice was running for New York State Attorney General. 
Mark Hamblett, Court Faults Abuse Prosecution but Rejects Petition for 
Habeas, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 17, 2010, at 1. Any concern, however, that her 
announcement was political was alleviated in November 2010 when she 
appointed a diverse advisory panel of experts that included Barry Scheck of 
the Innocence Project, Susan Herman, a criminal justice professor at Pace 
University, and Mark Pomerantz, a well-known New York trial attorney. 
Keshner, supra. 
107. Hamblett, supra note 106. 
108. Id. at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
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should have engaged in its “lengthy discussion of the facts and 
circumstances that Friedman asserts led to his conviction, 
much less assume the truth of those facts or the misconduct of 
police officers, prosecutors, defense counsel, and the presiding 
state court judge before a hearing.”109 Nonetheless, Judge 
Raggi did agree that “the facts alleged are disturbing and may 
well warrant further inquiry by a responsible prosecutor‟s 
office.”110 
The court responded to her concerns in the main opinion. 
After pointing out that all three panel members did agree that 
a reinvestigation was warranted, the court stated that it would 
prefer for the facts to be developed at a hearing.111 It lamented, 
however, that it simply did not have the power to order it over 
the objection of the district attorney, who refused to waive the 
defense of statute of limitations.112 
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that its purpose in 
engaging in the lengthy discussion of actual innocence was “to 
make the case that a „further inquiry by a responsible 
prosecutor‟s office‟ is justified despite a guilty plea entered 
under circumstances which clearly suggest that it was not 
voluntary.”113 It concluded, “an appellate court faced with a 
record that raises serious issues as to the guilt of the defendant 
and the means by which his conviction was procured, yet 
unable to grant relief, is not obligated to become a silent 
accomplice to what may be an injustice.”114 
Thus, the court viewed the purposes of its discussion as 
two-fold: to make the case for a reinvestigation and to voice its 
concern about a possible injustice. But it was not any type of 
injustice. It is clear from the decision that the injustice here 
was the potential actual innocence of Jesse Friedman.  
Although the manner in which it proceeded was 
unorthodox, the court‟s focus on whether there had been an 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 160-61. 
112. Id. at 161. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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injustice was justified based on the central role that actual 
innocence plays in habeas law. Further, the call for a 
reinvestigation was a creative and prudent step forward for 
actual innocence cases.  
 
A. The Call for a Reinvestigation Carefully Balanced the 
Equitable Principles Present in Habeas Jurisprudence 
 
The history of the writ of habeas corpus has been 
“inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental 
rights of personal liberty. . . . [I]ts function has been to provide 
a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to 
be intolerable restraints.”115 “[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an 
equitable remedy.”116 Over the years, habeas courts “acquired 
„enormous flexibility and power.‟”117 In this regard, the habeas 
corpus statutes provide that a court entertaining an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus shall “dispose of the matter as law 
and justice require.”118 
At this point, there can be no doubt that actually innocent 
people are suffering intolerable restraints. “Legal and scientific 
studies clearly establish that the conviction and execution of 
innocent Americans does occur.”119 Since the dawn of the DNA 
era in the late 1980s, over 250 people have been exonerated of 
 
115. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). 
116. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995). 
117. Segal, supra note 20, at 230 (quoting Max Rosenn, The Great Writ: 
A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 353 (1983)). 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). 
119. Segal, supra note 20, at 225 (citing a “conservative study” that 
estimated almost 10,000 innocent citizens are convicted each year); Jake 
Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception 
to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 377 
& n.154 (2001-2002) (listing articles detailing numerous wrongful 
convictions). See also Mourer, supra note 20, at 1283-84; Berg, supra note 23, 
at 121 (“We now know that we convict innocent people of crimes, including 
murder, and we know that we sometimes sentence innocent people to death. 
The American public now believes that we execute innocent people, and the 
unease about the specter of this happening has reached the chambers of the 
Supreme Court . . . .”) (quoting Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 61, 63 (2003)). 
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serious crimes due to new and material evidence.120 “We now 
know, in a way almost unthinkable even a decade ago, that our 
system of criminal justice, for all its protections, is sufficiently 
fallible that innocent people are convicted of capital crimes 
with some frequency.”121 It cannot be denied that “depriving 
the innocent of life and liberty completely undermines the 
public‟s confidence in our criminal justice system.”122 
And the federal courts have a critical role in ensuring 
protection of the innocent. “[N]ot only should the innocent 
defendant not be incarcerated or executed—that is patently 
obvious—but it is a responsibility of the federal courts to see 
that this does not occur.”123 One district court judge in New 
York has stated that “[i]f there is any core function of habeas 
corpus—any constitutionally required minimum below which 
the scope of federal habeas may not be reduced—it would be to 
free the innocent person unconstitutionally incarcerated.”124 
“The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered 
with the initiative and flexibility essential to ensure that 
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and 
corrected.”125 
Thus, federal courts in habeas cases should exercise their 
broad equitable powers in such a way as to ensure that 
innocent persons do not suffer unjust punishment. The call for 
reinvestigation is just such an equitable response. Notably, 
even in her concurrence, Judge Raggi did not object to a call to 
 
120. David Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1028. 
121. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002). 
122. Segal, supra note 20, at 236 (citing Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual 
Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute of Limitations Bar on the Filing 
of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2136 (2002)). 
123. Sussman, supra note 119, at 367-68 (quoting Bruce Ledewitz, 
Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 415, 430 (1990-1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124. Alexander v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also 
Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 248, 323 (1988) 
(“Although the concept of „actual innocence‟ has not explicitly played a part in 
federal post-conviction jurisprudence until recently, it is obvious that an 
enlightened system of justice should not tolerate continued incarceration of 
one who is demonstrably innocent.”). 
125. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969). 
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reinvestigate the case.126 
The call for a reinvestigation appropriately balances the 
equitable concerns present in habeas law—fairness, finality, 
and federalism.127 The utility of a reinvestigation in certain 
cases cannot be denied, as recent history has shown that 
reinvestigations have led to numerous exonerations.128 
Fairness dictates that all legitimate post-conviction claims to 
innocence should be fully investigated to determine whether 
there has been an injustice. And, in our criminal justice 
system, the prosecution plays a vital role in ensuring that such 
an injustice does not occur. As the New York Court of Appeals 
has stated, “[p]rosecutors occupy a dual role as advocates and 
as public officers and, as such, they are charged with the duty 
not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is 
done.”129 As the Second Circuit pointed out in Friedman, that 
 
126.  Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 161-62 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
127. Daniel M. Bradley, Jr., Schlup v. Delo: The Burden of Showing 
Actual Innocence in Habeas Corpus Review and Congress’ Effort at Reform, 
23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 463, 483 (1997) (“Fairness, 
finality, and federalism are considered the touchstone principles that guide 
and shape habeas jurisprudence.”); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930, 945 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (stating that the goals of the 
AEDPA were to “further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” 
(quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003))); Eric Seinsheimer, 
Supreme Court Review: Dretke v. Haley and the Still Unknown Limits of the 
Actual Innocence Exception, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 905, 907 (2005) 
(“[I]t is the precarious balance between a prisoner‟s right to freedom from 
unlawful confinement and a state‟s interest in comity and finality that 
continues to avoid simple resolution today.” (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 368 (6th ed. 2002))). 
128. For example, the well-known Medill Innocence Project at 
Northwestern University, under the direction of Professor David Protess, has 
been able to uncover evidence through post-conviction investigation to free 
eleven innocent men. MEDILL INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.medillinnocenc 
eproject.org/home (last visited Feb. 1, 2011); see also Monica Davey, 
Prosecutors Turn Tables on Student Journalists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at 
A14. The Medill Innocence Project is now part of The Innocence Network, a 
consortium of more than fifty similar projects at journalism and law schools. 
See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members.ht 
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). In 2009 alone, the network‟s investigations led 
to twenty-seven exonerations. Innocence Network Exonerations 2009, THE 
INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/report09.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
129. People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509, 511 (N.Y. 1993); see also 
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obligation to seek justice clearly continues after a conviction.130 
The court pointed out that the New York Rules of Professional 
Conduct for prosecutors do require the prosecutor to act, post-
conviction, when it appears that an injustice has occurred.131 
In fact, the Supreme Court has also discussed a 
prosecutor‟s duty to correct wrongful convictions. In Imbler v. 
Pachtman,132 the Court explained that one of the justifications 
for granting absolute immunity to prosecutors lies in the fact 
that they have a continuing duty to correct injustices. 
Specifically, the Court stated: 
 
The possibility of personal liability also could 
dampen the prosecutor‟s exercise of his duty to 
bring to the attention of the court or of proper 
officials all significant evidence suggestive of 
innocence or mitigation. At trial this duty is 
enforced by the requirements of due process, but 
after a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by 
the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate 
authority of after-acquired or other information 
that casts doubt upon the correctness of the 
conviction.133 
 
As can be seen, even the Supreme Court sees the obligation to 
reinvestigate legitimate claims of actual innocence as a 
continuing and fundamental aspect of a prosecutor‟s duty to 
seek justice. 
The call for a reinvestigation also does not undermine a 
state‟s interest in finality. “Habeas corpus law is one of the 
 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecution‟s interest] 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, [the 
prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”); see 
also N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
130. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
131. Id. at 159 (citing N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6B). 
132. 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976). 
133. Id. (emphasis added). 
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most contentious areas of law because it is the only instance in 
which federal courts can review and overturn state court 
decisions without giving res judicata effect to those 
decisions.”134 One of the main counterbalancing forces to that 
power is the state‟s strong interest in the finality of a criminal 
conviction.135 The call in Friedman does not run counter to that 
interest. It is a moderate approach that respects the finality of 
the conviction—the conviction remains in place—but creates 
the possibility that a miscarriage of justice will be corrected. 
Notably, there is no guarantee that the investigation will have 
any effect on the finality of the conviction. As Judge Raggi 
stated in her concurrence, no one can “predict whether the 
outcome of any such inquiry will be favorable to petitioner.”136 
The call for reinvestigation simply provides a mechanism for 
further review that could lead to a more accurate conclusion. 
But no matter the outcome, there will be clear societal 
benefits. If the prosecution investigates the case and concludes 
that there was an injustice, then society can be assured that, 
when the conviction is vacated, even the prosecution believes 
that justice is being served. On the other hand, if the 
reinvestigation leads to evidence that shows that the conviction 
is reliable, then public confidence in the criminal justice system 
will be replenished.137 
In a similar vein, the call for a reinvestigation is fully 
consistent with the notions of comity and federalism. It is a 
hands-off approach that affirms state sovereignty138 as it 
provides a state agency with full discretion to determine the 
extent of the investigation and whether, after further 
 
134. Andre Mathis, A Critical Analysis of Actual Innocence After House 
v. Bell: Has the Riddle of Actual Innocence Finally Been Solved?, 37 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 813, 815 (2007) (citing MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
FEDERAL COURTS 623 (5th ed. 2002)). 
135. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 739 (1991). 
136. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
137. See Bradley, supra note 127, at 485-86 (“It is not in society‟s 
interest, however, to punish those who are completely innocent of a crime.”). 
138. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenges of Actual Innocence 
Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 499 (1998) (“Other 
commentators maintain that the concept of state sovereignty is affirmed by 
the states themselves adjudicating claims of actual innocence.”). 
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investigation, the conviction should be upset.139 
In further support of the court‟s actions, the call for an 
investigation is completely in line with current trends in the 
criminal justice system. As concerns for the wrongfully 
convicted have grown, many states and local district attorney‟s 
offices have taken steps to address these concerns.140 One of the 
more significant developments has been the establishment of 
post-conviction investigatory units. For example, through 
statute, North Carolina established the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry Commission, a state agency established to 
“investigate and evaluate post-conviction claims of factual 
innocence.”141 Further, an “emerging trend” is for district 
attorney‟s offices, including the New York County District 
 
139. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6D (2009). 
 
If the prosecutor comes to know of clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that 
the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor should seek to 
remedy the injustice by taking appropriate steps to remedy 
the wrongful conviction. These steps may include, 
depending on the particular circumstances, disclosure of the 
evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint 
counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where 
appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor believes 
that the defendant was wrongfully convicted. 
 
Id.; see, e.g., People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) 
(Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (“If on further investigation the District Attorney 
shares these concerns, he has the power and, I am confident, the motivation, 
to take whatever steps are appropriate to do justice.”). 
140. Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1031-32 (discussing the different methods 
states have developed to address wrongful convictions, such as DNA testing 
statutes and commissions to study systemic problems leading to wrongful 
convictions). 
141. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://www.innocencecommis 
sion-nc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). See also Larry May & Nancy Viner, 
Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482, 496 
(2005) (recommending creation of special appellate court or permanent 
special master to consider evidence of actual innocence). Canada and 
England have also set up post-conviction innocence commissions. Bruce A. 
Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction 
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 490-92 (2009) (discussing 
England‟s Criminal Cases Review Commission and Canada‟s Criminal 
Conviction Review Group). 
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Attorney‟s Office, to set up wrongful conviction units to 
potentially reinvestigate wrongful convictions.142 
As Barry Scheck has stated, the development of these 
conviction integrity units within district attorney‟s offices 
“represents an extremely significant first step toward achieving 
serious quality assurance in the criminal justice system.”143 
Prosecutors have greater access to resources that simply are 
not readily available to other entities,144 in particular pro se 
 
142. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., A Conviction Integrity Initiative, 73 ALB. L. 
REV. 1213 (2010) (announcing the establishment of New York County District 
Attorney‟s Office Conviction Integrity Unit); John Eligon, Prosecutor in 
Manhattan Will Monitor Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at A20. It 
also appears that the Kings County District Attorney‟s Office has such a unit. 
See People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (Sup. Ct. 2003). One of the more 
effective units has been the one established in Dallas County, which has 
played a role in over twenty exonerations, including two non-DNA cases. 
Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need 
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2215, 2250 n.99 (2010). Another notable unit is the Post Conviction 
Review Section assembled in 2009 by the Harris, Texas County District 
Attorney to investigate credible claims of innocence. James McKinley, 
Cleared, and Pondering the Value of 27 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at 
A12. As of July 2010, that unit had cleared two wrongfully convicted men, 
Michael Anthony Green and Allen Wayne Porter. Peggy O‟Hare, Odds Still 
Against Clearing Convicts, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2010, at A1. 
143. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2256. 
144. For example, in a footnote in his Conviction Integrity article, Scheck 
discusses the exoneration of Steven Phillips. Id. at 2250 n.101. After the 
exoneration, the police investigator of the prosecution‟s conviction integrity 
unit pursued a lead with police departments in other states until the 
investigator was able to identify the perpetrator of the crimes to which 
Phillips had originally pled guilty. Id. Similarly, in arguing why it was 
important for prosecutors to reinvestigate post-conviction innocence claims, 
Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky state that, “it will be difficult without the 
prosecutor‟s assistance to prove the defendant‟s innocence, because the 
defense will rarely have access to evidence comparable to that of the 
prosecution.” Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 502 (2009). They use 
the infamous case of the two defendants who were convicted, but later 
exonerated, of the murder of a bouncer outside the Palladium nightclub as an 
example. Id. at 502-03. 
 
The prosecution had access to imprisoned witnesses and 
other witnesses who were far more likely to speak with law 
enforcement authorities than with defense counsel. 
Evidently, the prosecutor‟s familiarity with some of the 
exculpatory evidence from having personally conducted 
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prisoners.145 They have the ability to review their own files, 
which contains the full investigatory material gathered in 
every case. Prosecutors will also have better access to police 
departments and whatever materials they may have available 
in a case. Further, they will have experienced investigators on 
staff who can be dispatched quickly and efficiently to 
investigate any credible claim of innocence. In addition, as 
more and more district attorney‟s offices develop the post-
conviction units and take on more cases, the prosecutors and 
investigators will gain an expertise in pursuing the validity of 
these claims.146 
On the other hand, the existence of these units does not 
provide a full guarantee that credible claims will be 
investigated. There are strong “psychological reasons why 
prosecutors might be unduly skeptical of post-conviction 
challenges.”147 Even with the existence of the unit, there 
 
aspects of the investigation was superior to that of defense 
counsel. 
 
 Id. 
145. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 508-09 (“Prosecutors must 
assume this responsibility because convicted defendants generally lack the 
resources to uncover new evidence or to follow up effectively on their own.”); 
Segal, supra note 20, at 248 (“It would appear very difficult for pro se 
prisoners, while incarcerated, to satisfactorily perform witness investigations, 
secure post-conviction DNA testing, or analyze physical evidence.”); Zheng, 
supra note 122, at 2135 (“It is convenient to blame prisoners for inactivity, 
but prisoners generally lack the resources necessary to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the new evidence by themselves.”). 
146. See Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1033, 1075. 
147. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 472, 487-88. Discussing 
“cognitive bias” that can affect a prosecutor in the post-conviction setting, the 
authors state: 
 
There is a significant body of social science literature about 
how human judgment is skewed by psychological biases, 
such as “confirmation bias” and “hindsight bias.” Cognitive 
biases account for what is popularly known as ”tunnel 
vision,” the human tendency to evaluate evidence through 
the lens of one‟s preexisting expectations and conclusions. 
 
Id. 
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certainly can be “a natural unwillingness”148 for a district 
attorney‟s office to reopen a conviction that its own office 
obtained—either by jury verdict or guilty plea—particularly 
where they believe that the proper procedures were followed.149 
Indeed, in a high profile case such as Friedman, it would seem 
unlikely for the prosecution to second-guess how it handled the 
case where each step in the process was so carefully watched 
by the media and the public.150 When a prosecutor publicly 
questions the reliability of the conviction in such a case, there 
is a fear that the public‟s confidence in the district attorney‟s 
office will be undermined.151 There certainly is a potential that 
 
148. People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt, 
J., concurring). 
149. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 475, 487-89. 
150. Green and Yaroshefsky point out that, in the Palladium case, see 
supra note 144, allegations were made that a prosecutor‟s “political self-
interest” may have motivated his actions in the post-conviction proceedings. 
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 467-70. In that case, a senior 
prosecutor in the New York County District Attorney‟s Office was assigned to 
reinvestigate after the defense came forward with new exonerating evidence. 
Id. at 467-68. After investigating the evidence, the prosecutor became 
convinced of the defendants‟ innocence and chose not to challenge their post-
conviction motion for relief from the judgment. Id. at 468. This decision, 
however, was overruled by more senior prosecutors. Id. 
 
[A] New York Times article raised questions about how the 
district attorney made the decision to reject the senior 
prosecutor‟s recommendation to assent to the defendants‟ 
release, suggesting that the district attorney may have been 
motivated by political self-interest during an election year 
in which his opponent publicly criticized how his office had 
handled the case. 
 
Id. at 469. Although the district attorney denied the allegation, id., there is 
no doubt that high profile cases can lend themselves to such suspicions. See 
generally Martin v. Hunter‟s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (“The 
constitution has presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state 
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be 
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.”). One 
commentator has stated that, “if the state‟s trial system fails to protect an 
individual, it is important for habeas corpus to safeguard the kind of injustice 
that can result. In fact, historical interpretation shows that Congress enacted 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to protect individuals against possible state 
abuse.” Bradley, supra note 127, at 487. 
151. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 475-76. 
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fear of these types of repercussions can prevent a prosecutor 
from taking corrective action.152 
This is precisely why the Second Circuit‟s actions in 
Friedman represent such an important check on the system. 
The court used its equitable powers in a prudent and 
minimally intrusive way and asked that a significant claim of 
innocence be reinvestigated. It provided the proper balance 
between the interests of finality and federalism and a habeas 
court‟s supervisory power to protect the integrity of the state‟s 
criminal justice system.153 Indeed, while the Second Circuit‟s 
action provided public pressure on the district attorney‟s office 
to act, it also removed pressure on the office to refrain from 
acting out of concern for how such action would appear to the 
public. In other words, the court‟s actions provided cover to the 
prosecutor to take remedial action in Friedman. Further, the 
very threat that a federal court may make a public call for an 
investigation may compel district attorney‟s offices to act on 
their own to avoid the stigma and embarrassment that results 
from such a call from a court.154 
At the same time, there is an underlying concern that the 
court‟s call for a reinvestigation will be illusory. There is 
nothing that binds the prosecutor to reinvestigate the case. 
Further, even if the prosecution agrees to reinvestigate the 
 
152. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2237. Discussing the different reasons 
why a prosecutor may not turn over Brady material out of fear: “[f]ear is a 
powerful driver that can subvert almost any system or set of rules, and fear 
of losing cases can powerfully subvert the better natures of both prosecutors 
and defense lawyers engaged in an adversary system.” Id. 
153. Zheng, supra note 122, at 2118 (one of writ‟s main goals is to ensure 
“integrity of the criminal justice system”); Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1068 
(“The habeas regime we constructed in the second half of the twentieth 
century serves the important social interest of ensuring systemic compliance 
to constitutional due process.”). 
154. In an analogous context, one commentator has stated that threat of 
federal habeas corpus review has “perhaps motivated state courts to conduct 
their proceedings in a constitutional manner.” Zheng, supra note 122, at 
2137. Similarly, another commentator has argued that the mere existence of 
the North Carolina Innocence Commission, which is empowered to 
investigate post-conviction claims of innocence, “serves to remind law 
enforcement authorities that „winning‟ in front of a jury is not their goal; 
rather, bringing to justice actual criminal perpetrators is the goal.” Wolitz, 
supra note 22, at 1075. 
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case, there will be no oversight of the reinvestigation. There is 
no guarantee that the reinvestigation will be thorough or 
meaningful. 
Nonetheless, while real, these concerns do not militate 
against the court issuing the call. Despite the lack of oversight, 
criminal defendants clearly would prefer that these 
investigations occur. In fact, Jesse‟s attorney himself 
applauded the court for calling for the reinvestigation.155 For 
an actually innocent defendant, a good faith investigation into 
credible evidence of innocence opens the door, even if just a 
crack, to the chance that justice will be done.156 It is also true 
that a court is more willing to grant relief if the prosecutor 
joins in a defendant‟s post-conviction motion.157 And it must be 
emphasized that a prosecutor‟s “mission is not so much to 
convict as it is to achieve a just result.”158 If done with a mind 
to achieving justice, a prosecutor‟s reinvestigation could 
certainly lead to an exoneration. 
 
155. On the other hand, there is no doubt that defense attorneys will 
remain somewhat skeptical of a prosecutor‟s agreement to reinvestigate a 
case. For example, after the panel of advisors for the reinvestigation was 
appointed, Ronald Kuby stated, “I was extraordinarily mistrustful of District 
Attorney Rice‟s sudden change from obdurate obstructer [sic] to newfound 
champion of justice . . . . But for once my cynicism appears to have been 
misplaced.” Sean Gardiner, Review Slated for Abuse Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
9, 2010, at A25. Presumably in an attempt to encourage prosecutors to agree 
to reinvestigate cases, The Innocence Project honored the Harris County 
District Attorney‟s Office for its work in its post-conviction unit. See 
Innocence Project Honors District Attorney’s Post Conviction Review Section, 
THE CYPRESS TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.thecypresstimes.com/article/N 
ews/Local_News/INNOCENCE_PROJECT_HONORS_DISTRICT_ATTORN 
EYS_POST_CONVICTION_REVIEW_SECTION/34865. 
156. After pointing out that the Kings County district attorney had 
established a section to establish post-conviction claims of innocence, a trial 
level judge noted that he was aware of several cases in Kings County where 
the prosecution had requested the court to vacate a conviction based upon 
what was later determined to be an unjustified conviction. People v. Cole, 765 
N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (Sup. Ct. 2003); see also People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d 
1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring). 
157. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 486-87. 
158. People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980). See also Green 
& Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 505 (“Not only does the executive branch 
have a constitutional obligation to free the innocent, it has a moral 
responsibility to do so.”). 
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Thus, the Second Circuit‟s call for a reinvestigation was a 
creative, minimally intrusive, and meaningful step towards 
addressing the persistent problem of wrongful convictions. 
 
B. Actual Innocence Is a Central Component of Habeas Law 
 
The more controversial aspect of the Second Circuit‟s 
decision in Friedman was the court‟s focus on Jesse‟s claims of 
innocence. Even though the call for a reinvestigation may have 
been justified, that call was only made after a lengthy 
discussion of the facts and circumstances of Jesse‟s case. But it 
must be remembered that the actual legal claim raised in the 
petition was both procedurally defective and substantively 
meritless. Further, the claim itself did not require the court to 
engage in a “lengthy discussion of the facts and circumstances” 
of the case. The Brady claim failed for purely legal reasons—
impeachment evidence does not justify relief under Brady in 
the plea context and the claim otherwise did not meet the 
standard for granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
Despite these clear logistical problems, the Friedman court 
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the petitioner‟s potential 
innocence. 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit headed down a proper 
path in making actual innocence a central focus of the decision. 
 
[C]oncern about the injustice that results from 
the conviction of an innocent person has long 
been at the core of our criminal justice system. 
That concern is reflected . . . in the “fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man go free.”159 
 
Following that principle, the Supreme Court has clearly 
provided that actually innocent persons “should be afforded 
certain protections in order to „balance the societal interests in 
 
159. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources 
with the individual interest in justice that arises in the 
extraordinary case.‟”160 As one commentator has stated, 
“[i]nnocence is now unquestionably relevant to federal habeas 
corpus review.”161 
In his highly influential article from 1970, Second Circuit 
Judge Henry Friendly urged that actual innocence play a 
central role in habeas corpus jurisprudence.162 The article was 
a response to the expansion of habeas corpus that occurred 
after the Supreme Court‟s seminal decision in Brown v. 
Allen,163 which brought several federal constitutional 
challenges under the umbrella of federal court habeas review of 
state court convictions.164 Judge Friendly complained that, 
through this expansion of the doctrine, “the one thing almost 
never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was 
innocent of the crime.”165 He suggested that, before a federal 
court should entertain a habeas petition, a petitioner must 
“supplement[ ] his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of 
innocence.”166 He defined a colorable claim: 
 
 
160. Sussman, supra note 119, at 378 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 
(1995)). See also Engle v. Issacs, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (“In appropriate 
cases [the principles of finality and comity] must yield to the imperative of 
correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.”). 
161. Sussman, supra note 119, at 378. See also May & Viner, supra note 
141, at 488 (“In these limited circumstances [i.e. when a state court is 
unwilling or barred from considering actual innocence claims], federal courts 
should seriously consider actual innocence claims so that the general fidelity 
and respect for law, which is clearly an important federal issue, is not 
undermined.”). 
162. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142, 150, 160 (1970-1971). In 
fact, the influence of the article is still being felt today as even the Friedman 
court cited to the article to justify its discussion of petitioner‟s actual 
innocence. See Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
163. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown actually was three cases heard 
together: Brown v. Allen, Speller v. Allen, and Daniels v. Allen. 
164. Friendly, supra note 162, at 143-45; see also Zheng, supra note 122, 
at 2116-17 (discussing the expansion of the writ in the 1960‟s after the Brown 
decision). 
165. Friendly, supra note 162, at 145. 
166. Id. at 142. 
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The petitioner for collateral attack must show a 
fair probability that, in light of all of the 
evidence, including that alleged to have been 
illegally admitted (but with due regard to any 
reliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to 
have been wrongfully excluded or to have become 
available only after the trial, the trier of the facts 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his 
guilt.167 
 
Ironically, while Judge Friendly suggested a focus on 
actual innocence as a way to limit habeas review, notions of 
actual innocence have actually been used to expand the writ‟s 
availability. Over the years, several different types of actual 
innocence theories have come into existence: (1) actual 
innocence as a “gateway” claim to overcome a procedural 
default to challenge a conviction;168 (2) actual innocence “to the 
death penalty” as a “gateway” claim to overcome a procedural 
default to challenge the imposition of a death sentence;169 and 
(3) a freestanding actual innocence claim.170 As explained 
below, two of these actual innocence claims—the first of the 
gateway claims and the freestanding actual innocence claims—
could have easily been applied to Jesse‟s case. Before engaging 
in that analysis, it is important to set forth the general 
principles of these two innocence claims. 
 
1.  Actual Innocence Gateway Claim 
 
Petitioner‟s face a variety of procedural barriers when 
seeking habeas relief. Many habeas petitioners find their 
claims procedurally defaulted based on a failure to properly 
present the constitutional claim in state court.171 These 
 
167. Id. at 160. 
168. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 
169. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
170. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993). See generally Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
171. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977). These 
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procedural bars are typically justified out of concerns for 
federalism and comity to state courts.172 In order to obtain 
federal review of a procedurally-defaulted claim, a habeas 
petitioner must establish cause and prejudice before obtaining 
relief.173 
In the 1986 case Murray v. Carrier,174 the Supreme Court 
implemented the actual innocence exception to the procedural 
default rule. The petitioner in Murray did not properly exhaust 
the constitutional claim as he failed to raise it on direct appeal 
in state court.175 The Court concluded that the claim was 
procedurally defaulted and that the petitioner had not shown 
cause for the default.176 The Court went on to state that “[i]n 
appropriate cases” the principles of comity and finality that 
inform the concepts of cause and prejudice “must yield to the 
imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust 
incarceration.”177 To ensure that this occurs, the Court 
provided that, “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural 
 
procedural barriers include: the exhaustion doctrine—a petitioner must 
utilize all available remedies to assert his constitutional claim in state court, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)—and the 
independent and adequate state law ground—a constitutional claim is barred 
from federal review where a state court rejected the claim based on an 
independent and adequate state procedural rule, see Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 729-31 (1991). 
172. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31. 
173. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). “Cause” is defined as 
“whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the 
defense impeded counsel‟s efforts to comply with the State‟s procedural rule.” 
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. “Prejudice” is not as well-defined, but focuses on 
“actual prejudice” to the petitioner resulting from the constitutional error. 
Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. While difficult to quantify, the “actual prejudice” 
standard is at least stricter than the “plain error” standard courts use on 
direct appeal in criminal cases. Id. 
174. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
175. Id. at 482-83, 490-93. 
176. Id. at 492. 
177. Id. at 495 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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default.”178 
In the 1993 case Schlup v. Delo,179 the Supreme Court fully 
defined the contours of this new “gateway” actual innocence 
claim. A gateway innocence claim must be grounded in “new 
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific 
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 
evidence—that was not presented at trial.”180 Once it is 
determined that the evidence is reliable, a habeas court must 
consider the actual innocence claim in light of the evidence in 
the record as a whole.181 If the court concludes that, in light of 
all of the evidence, it is “more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” a petitioner may proceed through the 
gateway, and the court can address the merits of the 
underlying claim.182 
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which drastically altered habeas 
law to place significant restrictions on the availability of the 
writ to state prisoners.183 One of the main restrictions was the 
imposition of a one-year statute of limitations upon the filing of 
a federal habeas petition.184 The statute provides different 
dates from which the time period can begin to run: either “the 
conclusion of direct review”;185 “the date on which the 
impediment to filing” the claim was removed;186 “the date on 
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized 
 
178. Id. at 496. On the same day as Murray, the Supreme Court decided 
Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). The case concerned the situations 
under which a habeas court could consider a claim in a second or successive 
petition that had been raised in an earlier petition. Id. at 438. Relying 
heavily on Judge Friendly‟s article, a plurality of the Court concluded that 
such claims are barred from further review unless a petitioner “supplements 
his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Id. at 
454 (plurality opinion). 
179. 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
180. Id. at 324. 
181. Id. at 327-28. 
182. Id. at 327. 
183. Zheng, supra note 122, at 2111-14. 
184. Id. at 2113; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). 
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 
186. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(B). 
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by the Supreme Court”;187 or “the date on which the factual 
predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered through 
the exercise of due diligence.”188 The statute also allows tolling 
of the time period during which a properly filed application for 
post-conviction relief was pending in state court.189 Although 
the statute does not provide an actual innocence exception to 
the statute of limitations period, the Second Circuit has 
extended the “gateway” innocence claim to excuse a late filing 
from the one-year statute of limitations.190 
 
2.  Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim 
 
A freestanding actual innocence claim is rooted in several 
different concepts: substantive due process,191 procedural due 
process,192 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.193 
Despite the broad foundation, the Supreme Court has yet to 
establish a free-standing actual innocence claim.194 In fact, no 
federal court has ever granted relief on such a claim.195 There is 
a strong indication from Supreme Court case law, however, 
that such a claim does exist. In fact, as a result of a 2009 
decision from the Court, it would appear that the existence of 
 
187. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 
188. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
189. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 
190. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 2004). 
191. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431-35 (1993) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 829 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting); In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *43 (S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 24, 2010); May & Viner, supra note 141, at 494-95; Mourer, supra note 
20, at 1298, 1306-09. 
192. Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of 
Actual Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 237-39 
(2003). 
193. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re 
Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Mourer, supra note 20, at 
1298, 1309-10. See generally In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
194. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2321 (2009). 
195. Berg, supra note 23, at 136-37. 
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this type of claim has now become inevitable.196 
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of a 
freestanding innocence claim in Herrera v. Collins.197 The 
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found 
that a claim of actual innocence did not state an independent 
constitutional claim cognizable in a federal habeas petition, so 
long as the state allowed a defendant to obtain executive 
clemency based on actual innocence.198 Nevertheless, the 
majority assumed for the sake of argument that such a claim 
could exist.199 It stated that, for a defendant to be successful on 
such a claim, he would need to make an “extraordinarily high” 
threshold showing, which Herrera had not done.200 
Despite the majority‟s opinion, a “shadow majority” of at 
least five of the judges did conclude that a freestanding actual 
innocence claim does exist.201 In a concurring opinion joined by 
Justice Kennedy, Justice O‟Connor stated, “I cannot disagree 
with the fundamental legal principle that executing the 
innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution.”202 Justice 
White, also concurring, “assume[d] that a persuasive showing 
of „actual innocence‟ made after trial . . . would render 
unconstitutional the execution of [a] petitioner.”203 Further, in 
 
196. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251-52 (“There seems little doubt that if 
the appropriate case gets there, the Supreme Court will confirm that proof of 
actual innocence does state a constitutional claim.”). 
197. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
198. Id. at 398-417. 
199. Id. at 417. 
200. Id. at 417. 
201. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 829 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting); Sacco v. Greene, No. 04-CV-2391, 2007 WL 432966, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007); Berg, supra note 23, at 129; Greg Bylinksky, 
Herrera v. Collins: A New Innocence Principle?, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
191, 192, 199-200 (1994). 
202. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O‟Connor, J., concurring). 
203. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring). Justice White‟s concurring 
opinion is most notable for the standard he set for potential freestanding 
claims: “petitioner . . . [must] show that based on proffered newly discovered 
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, „no rational 
trier of fact could . . . [find] proof of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 
(1979)). “[M]ost courts tend to follow the standard set out in Justice White‟s 
concurring opinion for the requisite standard for free-standing actual 
35
662 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:2 
 
dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Souter, stated that a free-standing actual innocence claim did 
exist under the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clauses.204 Notably, in Schlup v. Delo, the 
Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that such a substantive 
innocence claim could be asserted if the evidence of innocence 
was “strong enough to make his execution „constitutionally 
intolerable.‟”205 
It now appears, however, that the Supreme Court has 
thrown the door wide open to the potential of a freestanding 
actual innocence claim.206 In In re Davis,207 the Court 
considered the original writ of habeas corpus of Troy Davis.208 
In the very brief opinion, the Court ordered that “[t]he [d]istrict 
[c]ourt should receive testimony and make findings of fact as to 
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time 
of trial clearly establishes petitioner‟s innocence.”209 
 
innocence claims.” Mathis, supra note 134, at 822. 
204. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his 
inimical style, Justice Blackmun stated, “Nothing could be more contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than 
to execute a person who is actually innocent.” Id. at 430 (internal citations 
omitted). See also In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“I do 
not believe that any member of a civilized society could disagree that 
executing an innocent person would be an atrocious violation of our 
Constitution and the principles upon which it is based.”). 
205. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995). 
206. Mourer, supra note 20, at 1279. 
207. 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009). 
208. Id. An “original writ” is distinct from a regular petition filed under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254. An original writ relies on the Supreme Court‟s power to 
consider a habeas petition under Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2241(b), 1651(a), and the Court‟s original jurisdiction under Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution. See Byrnes v. Walker, 371 U.S. 937 (1962). 
209. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1. The real battle in Davis occurred 
between the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Scalia. In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out it would be impossible 
for the district court to grant relief here since its power was restricted under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which only allows a grant of habeas where petitioner 
can show that the state court “adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” Id. at 2-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Because the question of whether a free-
standing actual innocence claim exists is an open question, there was no 
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The district court then held a hearing on the factual 
matters, but denied relief.210 Before addressing the factual 
matters presented at the hearing, the court indicated that it 
felt compelled to decide whether or not a freestanding actual 
innocence claim was cognizable under the Federal 
Constitution.211 In an exhaustive and compelling analysis, the 
court concluded that the execution of an innocent person would 
violate the Eighth Amendment‟s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.212 
As can be seen in response to Davis, the court that was 
required to address the freestanding actual innocence issue 
concluded that such a claim does exist under the Federal 
Constitution.213 This decision builds upon the prior indications 
from the Supreme Court that such a claim may exist upon a 
truly persuasive showing of innocence. As a result, “[t]here 
seems little doubt that if the appropriate case gets there, the 
Supreme Court will confirm that proof of actual innocence does 
state a constitutional claim.”214 The “lurking probability”215 of 
 
clearly established law on this principle. Id. at 3. Justice Stevens disagreed. 
He stated that the district court could conclude that § 2254(d) did not apply 
to an original writ or applied in only a modified form. Id. at 1 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). He suggested that the habeas statute may be unconstitutional to 
the extent that it restricted “relief for a death row inmate who has 
established his innocence.” Id. He further opined that a court could conclude 
that Supreme Court precedent does support a finding of a constitutional 
violation. Id. at 1-2 (citing In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., 
dissenting)). 
210. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 
2010). 
211. Id. at *37-39 & n.15. 
212. Id. at *37-43. Notably, in its decision, the district court did not 
address the § 2254(d)(1) question raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent. See 
supra note 209. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this lack of 
analysis is that the district court believed that there was clearly established 
law to support its conclusion, something that Justice Stevens suggested in his 
concurrence. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1-2. 
213. Davis filed a cert. petition directly with the Supreme Court, but the 
petition was denied. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787 (Mar. 28, 2011). 
214. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251 (arguing that the Court‟s actions in 
Davis in conjunction with the fact that six Justices in Herrera had “expressly 
[taken] the position that truly persuasive „freestanding‟ innocence claim 
would clearly be cognizable” supported the conclusion that the Court would 
conclude in the appropriate case that such a claim does exist). See also 
37
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this claim underscores the critical role that federal courts have 
in ensuring that an innocent defendant does not suffer an 
unjust incarceration.  
 Thus, the Second Circuit‟s actions in calling for a 
reinvestigation out of a concern of a possible injustice were 
fully justified. It carefully balanced the equitable principles 
present in habeas jurisprudence. It showed respect for the 
finality of the conviction and affirmed state sovereignty while, 
at the same time, sought to ensure protection of a potentially 
innocent petitioner. It was consistent with the current trend in 
our criminal justice system in which prosecutors have 
developed post-conviction investigatory units. Finally, the 
court‟s focus on actual innocence was in line with the expansive 
role that innocence plays in habeas law. In the end, the call for 
a reinvestigation was a prudent and reasonable approach to 
address a possible injustice. 
 
III.  Actual Innocence Claim Under the New York State 
Constitution 
 
In Friedman, the court noted that Jesse still had the 
potential to obtain relief in state court pursuing the actual 
innocence claim.216 It noted that some trial level courts in New 
York had acknowledged the existence of a freestanding actual 
innocence claim under the New York State Constitution.217 But 
if this possibility of relief existed, then it could be argued that 
the Second Circuit should not have reached out and called for a 
reinvestigation of the case. In fact, a reinvestigation may not 
even be necessary as Jesse may be able to obtain in court the 
ultimate relief that a reinvestigation would have provided—an 
exoneration. 
Even with the existence of the relatively new actual 
 
Mourer, supra note 20, at 1279 (as a result of its decision Davis, “[f]or the 
first time in history, the Supreme Court . . . has come close to recognizing this 
reality” of a freestanding actual innocence claim). 
215.  Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251. 
216. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159. 
217. Id. 
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innocence claim under state law, however, the call for a 
reinvestigation was still a necessary and important step. The 
call for a reinvestigation addresses the concern that, despite 
compelling new evidence of innocence, a defendant still may 
fall short of the demanding standard to establish an actual 
innocence claim. Under such a situation, a call for a 
reinvestigation would work to bolster society‟s confidence in the 
criminal justice system as it would provide an assurance that 
those highly credible claims of innocence have not been 
ignored, but instead have been fully explored. 
 
A. Freestanding Actual Innocence under the New York State 
Constitution 
 
In 2003 Justice John M. Leventhal, a New York State 
Supreme Court Justice in Brooklyn, became the first New York 
State judge to acknowledge the existence of a freestanding 
actual innocence claim under the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of section 5218 and the due process clause of 
section 6219 of article I of the New York State Constitution.220 
Justice Leventhal opened his opinion in People v. Cole with 
commentary on the meaning of a jury‟s verdict after trial.221 He 
stated that, in “American jurisprudence,” an acquittal does not 
necessarily mean that defendant “did not actually commit the 
crime,” only that the prosecution had failed to prove one of its 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.222 On the other hand, a 
guilty verdict only indicated that the government had met its 
burden, but not that the defendant had, with all certainty, 
committed the crime.223 After acknowledging the limitations of 
 
218. Utilizing the same language as the federal Constitution, section 5 
provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be 
unreasonably detained.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
219. Section 6 enumerates almost all of the numerous positive rights for 
criminal defendants including “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.” Id. § 6. 
220. People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 484-85 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
221. Id. at 478. 
222. Id.. 
223. Id. 
39
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our criminal justice system, Justice Leventhal stated that the 
issue in Cole was “what is a court‟s role when” a defendant 
makes a claim of actual innocence in a post-conviction motion, 
even though the defendant‟s conviction was procedurally 
proper in every other way.224 The court viewed its task as 
answering several questions, such as “what is the legal basis 
for the innocence claim? What criteria should a court use in 
determining, post judgment, the actual innocence of a 
defendant? If the court finds that a convicted person is in fact 
innocent, what is the appropriate remedy?”225 
Justice Leventhal noted that, in Herrera, the Supreme 
Court had refused to hold that a freestanding actual innocence 
claim existed under the Federal Constitution, so long as the 
state provided a possibility of a pardon based on actual 
innocence.226 Since New York provides for such a pardon, a 
New York inmate could not raise a claim under the Federal 
Constitution.227 
The judge pointed out, however, that “[t]he New York 
State Constitution grants an accused greater rights than those 
provided in the Federal Constitution.”228 “These . . . rights were 
granted to an accused in order to protect an innocent person 
from improper conviction.”229 For example, the state of New 
York “affords an accused broader rights to counsel than the 
Federal Constitution in order to insure that „the innocent go 
 
224. Id. 
225. Id. The judge also raised the question of whether separation of 
powers barred the court from considering the issue. Id. After reviewing the 
pardon process in New York, the court concluded that it remained a judicial 
function to: (i) “determine whether the New York State Constitution bars the 
conviction or the jailing of an actually innocent individual”; and (ii) “vacate a 
court judgment which violates the [c]onstitution.” Id. at 539. 
226. Id. at 484. 
227. Id. (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 19 (McKinney 2010)). 
228. Id.; accord, e.g., People v. Bermudez, No. 8759/91, 2009 WL 
3823270, at *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2009) (“[P]rocedural mechanism . . . for 
an incarcerated defendant to bring a post-conviction motion upon a claim of 
actual innocence” must exist under the New York State Constitution because 
the “[c]onstitution provides a state prisoner alleging actual innocence with 
greater protection than the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.”). 
229. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 484. 
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free.‟”230 Other state constitutional rights that have been 
interpreted more broadly than their federal counterparts also 
focus on protecting the innocent. These include the right of an 
accused to be present at trial,231 the requirement of indictment 
by grand jury,232 and a bar against the introduction of 
suggestive identification procedures.233 
As Justice Leventhal emphasized, “[o]ur Court of Appeals 
has recognized that the function of a criminal prosecution and 
the interest of society is to convict the guilty and to acquit the 
innocent.”234 The broad rights ingrained in the state 
constitution are meant to insure that the guiltless are not 
placed under unnecessary restraint.235 He concluded that “the 
ends of acquitting the non-guilty is an essential part of the 
constitution.”236 
The judge reasoned that the due process clause required 
that the government grant “elemental fairness” to an 
accused.237 “Further, a person who has not committed any 
crime has a liberty interest in remaining free from 
punishment.”238 He held that, for these reasons, “the conviction 
or incarceration of a guiltless person violates elemental 
fairness, deprives that person of freedom of movement and 
freedom from punishment and thus runs afoul of the [d]ue 
[p]rocess [c]lause of the [s]tate [c]onstitution.”239 He also 
determined that the punishment of “an actually innocent 
person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) 
committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment 
clause.”240 
 
230. Id. at 485 (quoting People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 386 (N.Y. 
1993)). 
231. People v. Mullen, 3744 N.E.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1978). 
232. People v. Infante, 511 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (App. Div. 1987). 
233. People v. Gee, 782 N.E.2d 1155, 1157-58 (N.Y. 2002). 
234. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (citing People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72, 
75 (N.Y. 1994)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. (citing People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1990)). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. In line with Justice Leventhal‟s conclusion, courts in other 
41
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Once he had concluded that a freestanding innocence claim 
existed under the state constitution, Justice Leventhal turned 
to the standard that should be used to determine whether a 
defendant has made the requisite showing of actual innocence. 
He reviewed the differing views of what the proper standard 
should be for such claims and stated that the standard must 
balance the interests of finality, the societal interest in seeing 
that an innocent person not face conviction or punishment, and 
the interest of an individual who has not committed a crime to 
remain at liberty.241 
Balancing those interests, the judge concluded that, to 
establish actual innocence, a defendant must demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could 
convict the defendant of the crimes for which he was 
convicted.242 Critically, Leventhal concluded that all credible 
evidence may be considered, including new evidence, whether 
or not that new evidence satisfies the typical factors used to 
judge whether it would justify a new trial.243 On a claim of 
 
states had concluded that their state constitutions also provided for free-
standing actual innocence claims. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 
1996); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007). See also In re Clark, 
855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993); Miller v. Comm‟r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108 (Conn. 
1997); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Ex 
parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex Crim. App. 1996). Other states have 
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Heffernan v. State, No. CR 02-239, 
2002 WL 1303388 (Ark. June 13, 2002); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 
(Fla. 2008); State v. Placzkiewicz, 36 P.3d 934 (Mont. 2001); Pellegrini v. 
State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001); State v. Byrd, 762 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2001); State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Reedy v. Wright, 
60 Va. Cir. 18 (2002). 
241. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. These are typically referred to as the Salemi factors. To 
constitute newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial, the evidence: 1. 
must be able to 
 
change the result if a new trial is granted; 2. . . . must have 
been discovered since the trial; 3. . . . could not have been 
discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; 
4. . . . must be material to the issue; 5. . . . must not be 
cumulative . . . ; and, 6. . . . must not be merely impeaching 
or contradicting the former evidence. 
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actual innocence a court should admit “any reliable evidence 
whether in admissible form or not . . . because the focus is on 
factual innocence and not on whether the government can 
prove the defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”244 
Finally, the judge considered what the proper remedy 
would be, namely a dismissal of the accusatory instrument.245 
He explained that this was the appropriate remedy because a 
defendant who proves his innocence by clear and convincing 
evidence has demonstrated that “there is no reasonable juror 
who could convict,” and therefore, there was no reason to order 
a new trial.246 He pointed out that, if a new trial was ordered 
and the petitioner was convicted again, the second conviction 
would be equally unconstitutional because there existed clear 
and convincing evidence that no jury could reasonably convict 
the defendant.247 
After Justice Leventhal‟s landmark decision in Cole, two 
other trial judges who have explicitly addressed the issue have 
concluded that such a claim may be raised.248 Further, several 
 
People v. Salemi, 128 N.E.2d 377, 381 (N.Y. 1955) (quoting People v. Priori, 
58 N.E. 668, 672 (N.Y. 1900)). These factors supplement and clarify the 
statutory right to obtain a new trial under New York law, which provides 
that a court should vacate a conviction where: 
 
New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a 
judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which 
could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial 
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such 
character as to create a probability that had such evidence 
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based 
upon such ground must be made with due diligence after 
the discovery of such alleged new evidence. 
 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(g) (McKinney 2010). 
244. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (citations omitted). 
245. Id. at 487. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. People v. Bermudez, No. 8759/91, 2009 WL 3823270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 9, 2009); People v. Wheeler-Whichard, 884 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
The Wheeler-Whichard court concluded: 
 
[I]t would be abhorrent to my sense of justice and fair play 
43
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other courts have assumed that a claim of actual innocence was 
cognizable, even though the defendant in those cases failed to 
prove he was actually innocent.249 
 
B. Does the Existence of the Freestanding Actual Innocence 
Claim Render a Call for Reinvestigation Unnecessary? 
 
It cannot be denied that the establishment of the 
freestanding actual innocence claim is a critical step towards 
addressing the fundamental problem of wrongful convictions in 
the New York State criminal justice system. Wrongfully 
convicted defendants now have a legal mechanism to raise 
their claims in state court—even if they are relying on newly 
discovered evidence that would not meet the requirements to 
justify a new trial. In fact, two defendants have been able to 
obtain relief under this newly-established claim.250 
The existence of this new claim, however, does not render 
the court‟s action in Friedman unnecessary. Despite the 
availability of relief under the state constitution, it remains the 
case that the standard for obtaining that relief is exceedingly 
high. A clear and convincing level of proof is an exacting 
standard. As Justice Leventhal stated in Cole, such a high level 
 
to do other than to vacate defendant's convictions . . . and to 
declare that he is innocent of this horrible murder, and to 
ensure he does not continue to serve any more time in 
prison for these convictions. 
 
Id. at 314. These courts have also adopted Justice Leventhal‟s standard for 
establishing innocence. Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *22; Wheeler-
Whichard, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 7313-14. See also People v. Days, No. 0469/01, 
2009 WL 5191433 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Dec. 31, 2009). No appellate court in New 
York, however, has yet addressed these issues. See generally People v. 
Tankleff, 848 N.Y.S.2d 286, 303 (App. Div. 2007) (declining to address 
whether a freestanding claim is cognizable under the state constitution). 
249. See, e.g., Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *13 (citing People v. Bryant, 
No. 3520/96, 2009 WL 3134841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 2009); People v. 
Bellamy, No. 194/94, 2008 WL 3271995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2008); People 
v. Bozella, No. 102/83, 2009 WL 3364575 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 14, 2009)). 
250. Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *38; Wheeler-Whichard, 884 
N.Y.S.2d at 313-14. 
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of proof is necessary to balance all of the competing interests.251 
It is a certainty, however, that some defendants will be able to 
come forward with compelling evidence of innocence that falls 
short of reaching the high standard to justify a dismissal of the 
accusatory instrument. And while two defendants have been 
able to obtain relief under this new claim, it does not alter the 
fact that other defendants with a real claim to innocence 
simply cannot reach the elevated evidentiary level. Such a 
reality is simply a natural result of how stringent the 
constitutional standard must be. 
But in such a case, that compelling claim of innocence can 
work to undermine the public‟s confidence in the criminal 
justice system.252 As previously stated, it is a “fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict 
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”253 Although 
a defendant in such a situation may not have enough evidence 
to be entitled to relief, real questions can be raised about the 
reliability of the conviction where a defendant has a legitimate 
claim to innocence. A call for reinvestigation serves to mollify 
such concerns without upsetting the finality of the 
conviction.254 In fact, upon further investigation, additional 
 
251. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
252. See Segal, supra note 20, at 249. The article discusses what one 
professor described as the “innocence gap”—the amount of exculpatory 
evidence sufficient to generate a profound sense of public discomfort with a 
conviction compared to the amount necessary to trigger a federal court‟s 
willingness to excuse a procedural default under Schlup. Id. It quotes an 
example from the same professor that suggests that a “large segment of the 
public undoubtedly would feel profoundly disquieted if they believed there 
was a fifty-fifty chance that a person whose constitutional rights may have 
been violated, and who was about to be executed, was actually innocent of 
any crime.” Id. at 250 (quoting Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: 
Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2350 
(2007)). See also Segal, supra note 20, at 238 (“[P]ublic fear and distrust 
arises [sic] as a result of incarcerating the innocent.”); Zheng, supra note 122, 
at 2136 (“Even if society can tolerate crooked prosecutors and incompetent 
lawyers in exchange for speedy justice as long as the system seemingly 
punishes the guilty, depriving the innocent of life and liberty would 
completely undermine the public‟s confidence in our criminal justice 
system.”). 
253. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
254. See generally Segal, supra note 20, at 250-51 (habeas law that does 
45
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evidence could be discovered that would either support or 
undermine the innocence claim. In either situation, the goals of 
the criminal justice system are advanced. 
Indeed, the decision in Cole itself provides a good example 
of a situation where the freestanding actual innocence claim 
fails to fully address a potential wrongful conviction. Although 
Justice Leventhal determined in Cole that a freestanding 
actual innocence claim does exist, he concluded that the 
defendant had not met the high standard for relief.255 
Nevertheless, his ultimate decision clearly left reason for the 
reader to feel uncomfortable about the reliability of the 
conviction. 
Cole had been convicted of first-degree manslaughter 
based on the shooting of Michael Jennings on a street corner in 
Brooklyn.256 During the initial investigation, various witnesses, 
including one named Fleming,257 identified people other than 
the defendant as the shooter. Each of the people identified were 
ruled out as suspects. Two eyewitnesses, including a man 
named Jeffrey Campbell, eventually identified Cole as the 
shooter.258 In his defense, Cole called an alibi witness.259 In 
addition, he also called another eyewitness who testified that 
he was not the shooter.260 So the evidence at trial, while strong, 
 
not take into account public‟s response to newly discovered evidence is “poorly 
calculated to assure the public that the „ends of justice‟ have been achieved” 
and those deserving of relief have obtained it (quoting Pettys, supra note 252, 
at 2352)). 
255. People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 487-88 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
256. Id. at 479. 
257. In the decision on Cole‟s habeas corpus petition, the district court 
judge identified Fleming as Winston Fleming. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736, 
2009 WL 3124771, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). The judge noted that 
Fleming had told the police that the shooter worked for someone named 
“Scotty.” Id. The investigating detective, however, never connected Cole to 
“Scotty” and did not even interview “Scotty.” Id. 
258. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479. It is notable that Campbell actually was 
originally arrested when a police officer saw him fleeing from the scene. Id. at 
479 n.1. He was later released, however, based on evidence that he was not 
the shooter. Id. He also received a benefit in his pending criminal case in 
exchange for his testimony. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771, at *1. The other 
eyewitness was named Charles Ford. Id. 
259. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479. 
260. Id. 
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did raise some questions about Cole‟s guilt. 
Several years after his conviction, Cole filed his section 
440.10 motion. Justice Leventhal held a hearing on the motion 
at which four eyewitnesses testified that Cole was not the 
shooter.261 Instead, they all identified a man named “Denzel” as 
the shooter.262 Each of these witnesses, however, had criminal 
records.263 In addition to these witnesses, Cole presented a 
videotaped statement from Campbell in which he recanted.264 
Justice Leventhal determined that Cole had failed to 
establish that he was innocent by clear and convincing 
evidence.265 He pointed out that Cole‟s witnesses had credibility 
problems and that their testimony was inconsistent with 
documentary evidence and testimony from police officers at the 
hearing.266 The judge rejected their testimony that they had 
spoken to police officers during the investigation.267 He also 
faulted their delay in coming forward. He found evidence that 
Cole or a person on his behalf threatened and bribed 
witnesses.268 
On the other hand, the judge also found significant reasons 
to think that there had been a wrongful conviction.269 He 
pointed out the critical fact that “[a]ll the descriptions given to 
the police at the time of the incident do not match that of the 
defendant‟s appearance at the time of the crime.”270 He also 
concluded that there were reasons to believe Cole‟s witnesses—
there was nothing in their demeanor to question their 
reliability and their testimony was consistent with each other 
 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. An investigator for petitioner testified that Ford had recanted to 
him. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736, 2009 WL 3124771, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2009). However, Ford later testified that he never recanted and he stood 
by his testimony. Id. 
265. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 487. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 481. 
268. Id. at 487. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
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and with Cole‟s trial witnesses.271 
Nevertheless, Leventhal concluded that the combination of 
these factors did not represent “clear and convincing evidence 
that no reasonable juror could convict the defendant.”272 
However, the judge did not end his decision there. He found 
that, for the purpose of “completeness” and should the 
appellate court adopt a different standard for an innocence 
claim, “that the defendant has shown that he is probably 
innocent (more likely than not approximating 55%).”273 
Thus, Cole stands as a good example of where the 
freestanding actual innocence claim does not do enough to 
address a compelling claim of innocence. The judge concluded 
that Cole was probably innocent. But this 55 percent innocent 
defendant must remain under restraint pursuant to what could 
be an unjust conviction. This result undermines confidence in 
the criminal justice system. Even with its protections and 
various post-conviction remedies, our legal system could have 
failed to prevent a wrongful conviction. 
Such concerns could have been alleviated here with a call 
for a reinvestigation.274 The utility of further investigation is 
apparent from the decision itself—it shows that the police 
 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. It should be noted that, in September 2009, a district court judge 
denied Cole‟s habeas petition. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736, 2009 WL 
3124771, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). After assuming, for the sake of 
the analysis, that an actual innocence claim exists under the Federal 
Constitution, the judge concluded that Cole had not even met the lower 
Schlup gateway standard. Id. at *6. In her analysis, the judge took a far more 
negative view towards Cole‟s claim of innocence than Justice Leventhal, 
finding that the credibility of the defense witnesses was “severely 
undermine[d]”—a factual finding that Leventhal did not make in his opinion. 
Id. She also did not defer to Leventhal‟s conclusion that Cole was “probably 
innocent.” Id. Nevertheless, the decision is not inconsistent with a call for a 
reinvestigation under Friedman. As discussed infra notes 289-90 and the 
accompanying text, the Friedman standard is lower than the Schlup 
standard. Under that standard, Cole‟s factual presentation could potentially 
justify a call for further investigation under the framework set up in 
Friedman. Because Cole pre-dates the Friedman decision, the district judge 
obviously did not have the benefit of Friedman to determine whether to make 
such a call for a reinvestigation. 
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received disparate information in their investigation, some of 
which was never fully investigated.275 With the new 
information provided by the defense, further investigation 
could have allowed the police to harmonize the evidence in 
their files, providing a possible lead on a way to identify the 
shooter. And while a hearing was held and Cole‟s witnesses 
were allowed to testify, that does not run counter to further 
investigation. Despite the ability to explore the factual 
allegations at the hearing, the government‟s position at the 
hearing was adversarial. From the decision itself, it is clear 
that the prosecution‟s goal at the hearing was simply to do 
what it took to defeat the motion. That is a qualitatively 
different posture than having investigators explore the 
credibility of the new evidence through further investigation 
which could potentially further petitioner‟s claim of 
innocence.276 Indeed, the Second Circuit asserted in Friedman 
that, even if the prosecution should take an adverse position to 
Jesse in post-conviction proceedings, the case would still 
benefit from a “complete review” by the prosecution.277 This 
review provides an important assurance that all legitimate 
claims of innocence will be fully explored to ensure that no 
injustice has occurred. 
 
275. As discussed supra note 257 and accompanying text, various 
witnesses, including one named Fleming, identified people other than the 
defendant as the shooter. However, each of the people who were identified 
were ruled out as a suspect. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479; see also Cole, 2009 WL 
3124771 at *1. Additionally, Fleming had told the police that the shooter 
worked for someone named “Scotty.” Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at *1. The 
investigating detective, however, never connected Cole to “Scotty” and did not 
even interview “Scotty.” Id. Further, it does not appear that the police ever 
investigated the evidence presented by the defense witnesses at the post-
conviction hearing that the shooter was a “Guyanese individual, known as 
„Denzel,‟ „GT,‟ or „Dooley,‟” even though one of these witnesses may have 
mentioned it to the police during the investigation. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at 
*2 & n.3. 
276. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 
1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that, even though prosecution may seek to 
reinvestigate to try and fight Osborne‟s claim to innocence, “such an 
investigation might instead lead in the opposite direction and further solidify 
Osborne‟s case for innocence”), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 
(2009). 
277. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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IV.  The Framework of a Friedman Call for a Reinvestigation 
 
The final question is whether the Friedman decision will 
have any impact on future cases. To be sure, the court‟s actions 
in Friedman have no precedential value. The call for a 
reinvestigation was clearly done in dicta. The court had already 
rejected the Brady claim as both procedurally defaulted and, in 
the alternative, on the merits. As a result, no federal court in 
New York is now required to consider whether to issue a call 
for a reinvestigation. 
Nevertheless, the same reasons that justified the Second 
Circuit‟s actions in Friedman would justify any other federal 
habeas court in making the same call for a reinvestigation. 
Once again, it is a balanced approach that furthers the federal 
court‟s critically important role of ensuring that a potentially 
innocent defendant does not suffer an unjust incarceration. 
However, the true innovation of the Friedman decision is that, 
beyond opening the door for federal courts to consider making a 
call for a reinvestigation in the appropriate case, the court 
established a responsible mechanism for determining when 
such a call should happen. 
The final part of this Article will first discuss the novelty of 
the court‟s approach in calling for the reinvestigation. Then, 
the article will break down the mechanism that the court used 
to provide guidance on how federal courts can apply it in future 
cases. 
 
A. The Mechanism Used in the Friedman Decision Was a 
Novel Approach to Considering a Petitioner’s Allegation of 
Actual Innocence  
 
The two actual innocence theories applicable to non-capital 
habeas cases, the gateway and freestanding actual innocence 
claims, clearly were applicable to the Friedman case. In 
Friedman, the court concluded that the petition was 
procedurally defective because it was untimely under the one-
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year statute of limitations.278 Thus, the gateway innocence 
claim was a route available to the court to address the actual 
innocence claim. In fact, it could be reasonably argued that the 
court should not have addressed the merits of the Brady claim 
at all unless it had first addressed the gateway innocence claim 
and concluded that it could consider a claim that was untimely. 
The court specifically declined, however, to address the actual 
innocence claim in this posture.279 
It is also clear that the court could have easily addressed 
the actual innocence claim as a substantive freestanding claim. 
The court did not, however, frame its analysis in that way. In 
fact, the court sidestepped the issue entirely, saying that it did 
not have the authority to grant relief on the claim since it was 
unexhausted.280 But the court could have easily navigated 
around that procedural issue—at least to the extent that it 
wanted to address the merits of the claim without going so far 
as granting relief. A federal court has the power to stay and 
hold a petition to allow for a petitioner to exhaust a claim in 
state court so long as the claim to be exhausted is not “plainly 
meritless.”281 Thus, in service of the freestanding actual 
 
278. Id. at 152. 
279. Id. 
280. It is true that the claim was unexhausted, but it is not clear that a 
meaningful remedy was available to Jesse. In New York, a court “may” deny 
a motion to vacate where a defendant was in a position to adequately raise 
the issue but did not do so. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(c) (McKinney 
2010). Thus, the state court would not be required to consider the claim but 
could dismiss for the sole reason that it was not raised at an earlier time. Id. 
On the other hand, the court also has the discretion to grant the motion “in 
the interest of justice and for good cause shown” where the claim has merit. 
Id. 
281. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005); Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 
F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a stay of petition is “preferable” in 
“many cases” where petitioner has unexhausted claims). This “stay and 
abeyance” procedure also requires that the petitioner show “good cause” for 
the failure to exhaust the claim. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. This is a lenient 
standard that would not have presented any hurdle for the Second Circuit. 
Indeed, a generalized claim of “reasonable confusion” is sufficient to establish 
“good cause.” Whitley v. Ercole, 509 F. Supp. 2d 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(adopting dicta from Pace v. DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005)). Here, the 
court could have easily found that Jesse harbored “reasonable confusion” over 
whether a freestanding actual innocence claim existed or whether it would 
apply to a defendant who had pled guilty. 
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innocence claim, the court could have easily reviewed the 
merits of the unexhausted claim. 
The court chose, however, not to link its discussion to any 
recognized actual innocence theory. Indeed, as Judge Raggi 
pointed out, the court reviewed the factual allegations in a 
different way than would appear to be allowed under either a 
gateway innocence claim or a freestanding innocence claim. 
Instead of pursuing a recognized theory, the court charted a 
new course and directly linked its extended discussion of the 
facts and circumstances to its desire to call for a 
reinvestigation. While it certainly is not novel for a court to call 
for a reinvestigation,282 the true innovation of the court‟s 
approach is that it only made the call after determining that 
the factual allegations had met a certain standard justifying 
further investigation. More specifically, the call was only made 
once the court concluded that there was substantial “new and 
material evidence” that created a reasonable likelihood of a 
wrongful conviction. This was a creative and reasonable 
approach, as it simply utilized an existing standard that the 
prosecution was already bound to follow.283 And that is the real 
value of Friedman for future cases—it established a 
responsible and workable mechanism for determining whether 
a habeas court should exercise its equitable powers to call for a 
reinvestigation.   
    
 
 
 
 
282. For example, in a concurring opinion in People v. Calabria, New 
York Court of Appeals Judge Rosenblatt “urge[d] the District Attorney to 
undertake a fresh and unbiased review of the case and investigate fully all 
the evidence.” 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring). 
He added that, even though the prosecution has fought the defendant in 
court, “this is a particularly disquieting case, one that calls for a new and 
fastidious layer of review. If on further investigation the District Attorney 
shares these concerns, he has the power and, I am confident, the motivation, 
to take whatever steps are appropriate to do justice.” Id. 
283. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159 (pointing to the standards that 
prosecutors must follow under the ethical rules in determining whether to 
conduct a further investigation after a conviction). 
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B. The Mechanism that a Federal Court Can Use in 
Determining Whether to Call for a Reinvestigation?   
 
The basic outline of the Friedman mechanism for deciding 
whether to call for a reinvestigation can be easily drawn from 
the Second Circuit opinion. This includes the legal standard, 
how a court should analyze the evidence in the petition, and 
the quality and quantity of evidence needed to justify the call 
for a reinvestigation. In addition, the opinion raises secondary 
questions related to habeas law that also need to be considered: 
the power of a district court to issue the call and the 
availability of making the call in the context of a second or 
successive petition. Each of these issues will be addressed in 
this section. 
Legal Standard. The Friedman court called for the 
reinvestigation based on its conclusion that “new and material 
evidence,” viewed in conjunction with the remaining evidence 
in the record, “suggest[ed] a reasonable likelihood” that Jesse 
Friedman was “wrongfully convicted.”284 
From the opinion itself, it is clear that the new evidence 
must be evidence that could not have been discovered prior to 
the conviction.285 The Second Circuit described that “[t]he „new 
 
284.  Id. at 159-60. 
285. It should be noted that a federal court‟s consideration of “newly 
discovered evidence” in this context is not inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court‟s recent decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). In 
Pinholster, the Court concluded that, in determining whether a state court‟s 
decision was an “unreasonable application” of federal law under 28 U.S.C § 
2254(d)(1), a habeas court is limited to the record that was before the state 
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. at 1398. Thus, under 
Pinholster, a habeas court is limited in the evidence in the evidence it can 
consider when deciding whether to grant habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C § 
2254(d)(1) (“an application . . . shall not be granted with respect to any claim 
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to). The 
question here is different and does not focus on the 2254(d) standard of 
review. Rather, it only concerns what evidence a court can consider when 
taking the less intrusive step in calling for a reinvestigation. There is nothing 
in Pinholster that would prevent a habeas court from considering any “new 
evidence” under those circumstances. Critically, the Supreme Court has 
authorized a federal habeas court to consider “new evidence” when 
53
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and material‟ evidence in [the] case [was] the post-conviction 
consensus within the social science community that suggestive 
memory recovery tactics can create false memories and that 
aggressive investigation techniques like those employed in 
petitioner‟s case can induce false reports.”286 Thus, the Second 
Circuit did not view any of Jesse‟s claims of newly discovered 
evidence—the suggestive techniques or the hypnosis—as newly 
discovered. The court obviously viewed that evidence as 
material—the court spent a good portion of its factual 
discussion recounting the suggestive techniques, which 
included the hypnosis.287 So its failure to mention this critical 
evidence as part of the “new and material” evidence justifying 
the reinvestigation suggests that the court did not believe that 
it was truly newly discovered.  
The other significant aspect of the standard is the focus on 
a reasonable likelihood of a wrongful conviction. It sets a 
relatively high bar for a call for reinvestigation. It clearly is 
lower than the “high standard”288 that it would take to 
establish a freestanding actual innocence claim. It also appears 
to be lower than the Schlup standard, which asks whether it is 
“more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”289 While 
the Friedman test does seem to ask for the same type of 
“probabilistic”290 assessment of the evidence as the Schlup test, 
the ultimate question under Friedman is not as stringent as it 
is in Schlup. A conclusion that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt is a demanding 
question that searches for a high level of proof that petitioner 
has established innocence. The Friedman standard has a 
broader, and less demanding, analysis of whether there has 
been a wrongful conviction. It looks more generally to whether 
 
determining whether the petitioner had established a gateway innocence 
claim. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). 
286. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 160. 
287. Id. at 146-48. 
288. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2321 (2009). 
289. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 
290. Id. at 329. Accord House, 547 U.S. at 538. 
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there are significant reasons to question the reliability of the 
jury‟s determination on the question of guilt or innocence, 
rather than determining that no juror would convict the 
defendant. While still high, it does not ask as much as these 
standards under other innocence-based theories. 
The lower standard for the call for an investigation makes 
sense. The call for a reinvestigation is far less intrusive into the 
finality of the conviction and does not raise the same type of 
federalism concerns as the innocence claims currently in 
existence. The freestanding actual innocence claim will directly 
void a conviction and end the criminal case entirely. Clearly, 
such an intrusive act by a federal court into the finality and 
autonomy of a state court proceeding should have the highest 
standard. While not as intrusive as a freestanding actual 
innocence claim, the Schlup test does provide for a gateway 
into federal review of a state court conviction. The ultimate 
resolution of that claim would be a federal court vacating a 
state court conviction. As discussed before, the call for a 
reinvestigation is far less intrusive. It does not have as direct 
an impact on the finality of the conviction. Indeed, there is no 
guarantee that any reinvestigation will result in any further 
challenges to the conviction.291 Further, it does not raise the 
same level of federalism concerns as it is solely asking for state 
actors to potentially act to rectify an injustice on their own.292 
Analysis of Evidence. In determining whether Jesse met 
the standard, the Second Circuit accepted the factual 
allegations set forth in the petition as true and then weighed 
that evidence against the remaining evidence in the case. In its 
detailed factual discussion, the court described much of what 
happened in the investigation as true, even though that 
evidence was not sworn testimony, but merely set forth in the 
habeas petition itself, the affirmations in support of the 
petition, or the transcripts of the documentary and its 
associated interviews.293 The same can be said about how the 
court discussed the prosecutor‟s and the court‟s actions in the 
 
291. See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161-62 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
292. See id. at 160 (majority opinion). 
293. Id. at 146-49. 
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case.294 In fact, the concurring judge accused the majority of 
doing just that, stating that the court simply “assume[d] the 
truth of those facts or the misconduct of police officers, 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and the presiding state court 
judge before a hearing.”295 Similarly, the court accepted the 
“social science consensus” in this case also without any sworn 
expert testimony to establish its reliability.296 
 The analysis on a Friedman claim, therefore, does not 
make an initial assessment of the credibility of the evidence. A 
court accepts the allegations as true and determines whether 
they are sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood of a 
wrongful conviction. Once again, such an analysis is less 
stringent than the Schlup standard, which requires the court 
to make an initial assessment of the reliability of the 
evidence.297 The Friedman court simply did not make such an 
evaluation. After accepting the allegations in the petition as 
true, the court then engaged in an assessment of all of the 
evidence in the record as a whole to determine the likelihood of 
a wrongful conviction.298 That represents the basic framework 
that a court would use in assessing whether to make the call 
for a reinvestigation. 
Certainly, a court accepting the allegations in the petition 
as true is a highly favorable analysis for a habeas petitioner. 
That beneficial standard of review, however, is limited by the 
amount or quality of evidence that would be needed to justify 
the call for a reinvestigation. In justifying its actions, the court 
stated that Jesse had come forward with “substantial evidence 
that flawed interviewing techniques were used to produce a 
flood of allegations.”299 There can be no doubt from reading the 
opinion that Jesse presented a great deal of evidence in support 
 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
296. See id. at 160 (majority opinion). 
297. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The Second Circuit has 
described the reliability analysis as “whether the new evidence is trustworthy 
by considering it both on its own merits and, where appropriate, in light of 
the pre-existing evidence in the record.” Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
298. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 157-60. 
299. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). 
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of his claim of innocence. Further, the evidence that was 
presented—including statements from most of the people 
involved in the criminal case—was substantial. Much of that 
can be attributed to the investigation done by the filmmakers 
in support of the documentary. It certainly will be unusual for 
a habeas petitioner to come across such a wellspring of 
compelling investigatory material after being convicted. 
Nevertheless, it is logical that a call for a reinvestigation 
from a court will look to whether “substantial evidence” has 
been presented. A reinvestigation necessarily needs evidence to 
support it. The more substantial the evidence presented—
either in terms of amount or character—the greater the 
justification there will be for a call to expend the required 
resources for the investigation. Similarly, the reinvestigation 
will more likely be fruitful if the basis for that effort is 
substantial evidence. 
Unfortunately, the Friedman decision provides little 
guidance on what type of evidence needs to be presented in 
order to justify a call for a reinvestigation. The Second Circuit 
stated that it had specifically considered the facts alleged in 
the petition, the sworn affidavits, the transcript of the movie, 
and the memoranda of interviews taken in preparation of the 
film.300 In addition, the court looked to media coverage and 
academic articles.301 As mentioned above, it represents a 
substantial body of evidence. But the court did not indicate 
that it was motivated to act on the basis of the type of evidence 
that was presented. More importantly, there was no indication 
that the court valued sworn statements in evaluating the 
claims. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that a court probably 
will not consider the evidence presented to be “substantial” 
unless it is supported, at least in part, by sworn statements.302 
 
300. Id. at 145. 
301. Id. at 148, 151, 155-58. 
302. Clearly, the court viewed a future § 440.10 motion raising an actual 
innocence claims as the means to which Jesse would be able to vacate his 
conviction, either on the basis of the evidence that he already had in his 
possession or the evidence that would be developed during the 
reinvestigation. See id. at 159. The Criminal Procedure Law requires that 
any such motion based on “the existence or occurrence of facts . . . must 
contain sworn allegations thereof . . . .” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1) 
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What court can consider making a call for a 
reinvestigation. In the Friedman decision, the court justified its 
call for a reinvestigation by stating that an “appellate court 
faced” with a disturbing record should not be a “silent 
accomplice to what may be an injustice.”303 There is no 
legitimate reason, however, to limit this authority to the circuit 
court. The court did not provide one in Friedman. At most, it 
seemed to suggest that an appellate court had an appellate 
record on which to base its decision to call for a reinvestigation. 
The “record” on which the Second Circuit based its conclusion, 
however, appears to be the same factual record that was before 
the district court. The court stated that its discussion of the 
facts was based on the allegations in the petition as well as the 
exhibits attached to that petition.304 Thus, the lower court was 
in the same position to make an assessment as to whether a 
call for a reinvestigation should issue. 
Moreover, outside of its role in screening applications for 
second or successive petitions, the circuit courts have no 
greater powers in habeas cases than the district courts. The 
habeas statutes provide district courts with the same authority 
to grant relief as circuit judges. In fact, the district courts 
review far more habeas cases than the circuit courts because 
they are required to consider all of the first habeas petitions 
filed by state inmates.305 The circuit courts only hear a small 
number of those habeas cases should the petition meet the 
demanding requirements for a certificate of appealability.306 
There is no reason why, when considering injustice in habeas 
cases, the power to make a call for a reinvestigation should be 
limited to a circuit court. The district courts are in an 
equivalent position to the circuit courts to consider whether a 
call for a reinvestigation could be made under the Friedman 
 
(McKinney 2004). This would also strongly suggest that any request for 
reinvestigation must contain some sworn allegations of fact. 
303. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161. 
304. Id. at 145. 
305. Ryan Hagglund, Review and Vacatur of Certificates of Appealability 
Issued After the Denial of Habeas Corpus Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 
994 (2005). 
306. Id. (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has long permitted Congress to 
significantly curtail a prisoner‟s right to appeal” a habeas denial.”). 
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framework. 
Under What Circumstances Should A Court Consider 
Making a Call for a Reinvestigation. The court‟s decision in 
Friedman provides a wide-range of possibilities under which a 
court could consider making a call for a reinvestigation using 
the Friedman framework.. In fact, there does not appear to be 
any limit on when a court can consider making the call. In 
Friedman, the court addressed the question of actual innocence 
even though it was not the claim raised in the petition. In fact, 
the actual claim raised in the petition was procedurally 
defective and substantively meritless.307 Indeed, the court 
concluded that it was not entitled to grant legal relief at all to 
Jesse on a freestanding actual innocence claim—even if it 
believed that Jesse had established his innocence under the 
demanding freestanding actual innocence standard—because 
Jesse had not properly exhausted such a claim in state court.308 
Despite all of these limitations, the court engaged in its actual 
innocence analysis. 
The court leapt every hurdle in its way in deciding to call 
for a new investigation. This means that, should another 
federal court desire to make a call for a reinvestigation under 
the mechanism set forth in Friedman, there are very few 
roadblocks. The petition must allege in the first instance a 
constitutional violation or the petition will be summarily 
dismissed.309 Yet, as Friedman shows, the constitutional claim 
need not detain the federal courts long. If the petitioner has 
made a substantial showing similar to the one set forth in 
Friedman, there would be grounds to consider making the call.   
An interesting question here is whether the circumstances 
in which a court could consider making a call for a 
reinvestigation include an application to file a second or 
successive petition. It can be assumed that some petitioners 
will discover new and material evidence after they have 
 
307. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 152-55. 
308. Id. at 159. 
309. See Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (2004) (“If it plainly appears from 
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the 
clerk to notify the petitioner.”). 
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already lost their first petition. Unfortunately, the AEDPA 
severely curtailed the ability of a petitioner to file a second or 
successive petition. A claim presented in a second petition that 
was raised in a previous petition must be denied.310 A claim 
presented in a second petition that was not raised in a previous 
petition must be denied unless there has been a retroactive 
change in law or the factual predicate for the claim is newly 
discovered.311 The habeas statute requires that a petitioner 
seek authorization from the appropriate federal circuit court.312 
That court can only grant authorization if the petitioner has 
made a “prima facie showing that the application satisfies the 
requirements of this subsection.”313 
Even under these strict requirements for gaining 
authorization to file a petition, there still would be room 
available for the court to consider making the call. Friedman 
shows that, no matter the obstacle to granting relief on the 
underlying claim, a court would still be empowered to consider 
whether a reinvestigation would be appropriate under the 
Friedman framework. The circuit court can deny authorization 
(just as Jesse was denied habeas relief in Friedman), but still 
address whether or not a call to reinvestigate should be 
issued.314 
In fact, it would appear that considering a call for a 
reinvestigation would be highly appropriate in these situations. 
One of the grounds on which a petitioner can obtain 
authorization to file a second or successive petition is on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence. The statute requires that 
 
310. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006). 
311. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). 
312. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
313. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 
314. An interesting side note is that the statute requires a court of 
appeals to decide upon the application for authorization within thirty days 
after the filing of the motion. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(D). However, even this 
limitation would not stand in the way of a court addressing a Friedman 
claim, which clearly would require more than thirty days to consider. The 
Second Circuit has stated that it “may exceed the 30-day time limit . . . where 
an issue requires a published opinion that cannot reasonably be prepared in 
30 days.” Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514, 517 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 43 n.3 (2010) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
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“the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.”315 
“[T]he facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light 
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, 
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty 
of the underlying offense.”316 A petitioner only needs to make a 
prima facie showing, however, which the Second Circuit does 
not consider to be a very penetrating analysis.317 Nevertheless, 
there does appear to be room here for a court to conclude that 
this standard for gaining authorization may not be met, but the 
factual allegations in the petition are enough for the court to 
consider whether a call for a reinvestigation is appropriate. 
Otherwise, where a petitioner does obtain authorization, this 
would seem like the precise circumstance where a federal court 
could consider making the call for a reinvestigation should the 
court deny relief on the legal claim in the petition.318 
 
315. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
316. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
317. Quezada, 624 F.3d at 521. Indeed, a petitioner does not need to 
show that he is entitled to relief on the underlying legal claim or even 
whether a federal court has the power to grant relief on the claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Id. This means that, even though it has not yet been 
officially recognized, a petitioner can seek authorization pursuant to a 
freestanding actual innocence claim. Thus, unless a petitioner has raised an 
actual innocence claim in the first petition, a petitioner will be able to, at the 
very least, put the innocence claim before the Second Circuit. 
318. An interesting example of the authorization process is the Cole 
case. According to the district court, the Second Circuit granted Cole 
authorization to file a second or successive petition. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-
CV-736, 2009 WL 3124771, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). Because Cole‟s 
legal claim—a freestanding actual innocence claim—clearly did not meet the 
requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A), it means that authorization had to have 
been granted on the factual predicate ground. Thus, it can be deduced that 
the Second Circuit believed that Cole had at least made a prima facie 
showing that, but for constitutional error, he is actually innocent by clear and 
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (circuit court may grant 
authorization to file second or successive petition where petitioner has made 
a “prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of the 
subsection”); see also Quezada, 624 F.3d at 520. This would seem to be 
enough to establish a Friedman actual innocence claim. However, as 
discussed supra note 274, the district court judge never considered a 
Friedman claim and, even worse, did not believe that Cole was even 
“probably” innocent. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at *7. No notice of appeal was 
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Guilty Plea vs. Conviction After Trial. Despite the fact that 
the call for a reinvestigation occurred in a case in which the 
petitioner had pled guilty, this does not mean that a Friedman 
claim is unavailable to a defendant who was convicted after 
trial. That cannot be the case as the ends of justice would not 
be served by limiting the claim to those defendants who plead 
guilty. In fact, the opposite is true. This is self-evident in one 
obvious way: a defendant who pleads guilty has, in nearly 
every case, admitted to committing the crime. A defendant who 
has gone to trial has maintained a plea of not guilty throughout 
the case. In this regard, it is not surprising that the great 
majority of exonerations in the DNA era have been in cases 
where the defendant was convicted after trial.319 A conviction 
after trial truly is the situation where a reinvestigation would 
most likely have the greatest impact. 
In fact, the debate really should be over whether a court 
should even consider making a call for a reinvestigation in 
those cases where a defendant has pled guilty. While strong 
evidence of guilt, a guilty plea does not necessarily “preclude 
the possibility of innocence.”320 Fortunately, the Second Circuit 
settled this issue in Friedman itself—a call for an investigation 
is an appropriate step in situations where the defendant has 
pled guilty.321 But using Friedman as a guide, a petitioner in 
 
ever filed. Even more tragic, it appears from the docket sheet that notice of 
the court‟s opinion was served on counsel, but that notice was returned to the 
court as a result of counsel‟s death. Thus, the notice of appeal does not appear 
to have been filed because petitioner or his representative never received 
notice of the decision. Since the entry of judgment occurred over 180 days 
ago, even if petitioner sought to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal, the 
request would have to be denied. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5). 
319. Among the over 250 exonerations from DNA evidence, only thirteen 
exonerations have occurred in cases where the defendant pled guilty. See 
Know the Cases, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/k 
now/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (1993 exoneration of 
William Kelly, 1997 exoneration of Keith Brown, 1999 exoneration of 
Anthony Gray, 2001 exonerations of John Dixon and Marcellius Bradford, 
2006 exonerations of Eugene Henton and James Ochoa, 2007 exoneration of 
Larry Bostic, 2008 exoneration of Steven Phillips (guilty plea only occurred 
after two hung juries) and 2009 exonerations of Kathy Gonzalez, Debra 
Shelden, Ada JoAnn Taylor, and Thomas Winslow). 
320. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 512-13. 
321. Indeed, it appears that the Second Circuit‟s reasoning was focused 
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such a situation would most likely need to allege that he was 
pressured into pleading guilty or that the plea was not 
otherwise voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.322 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that the situation in Friedman was quite 
extraordinary. It is not every day that a critically-acclaimed 
and influential documentary gets created about a criminal case 
and, through the creation of that movie, a critical assessment 
gets made of the fairness of the conviction. But while the case 
was exceptional in many ways, Jesse Friedman clearly is not 
the only person who can present compelling, new evidence of 
innocence. Using the framework set forth in the Friedman 
opinion, other federal courts should now consider whether to 
make a call for a reinvestigation in the appropriate case. 
“The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries 
esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal 
freedom.”323 However, no federal court has explicitly provided 
relief to a habeas petitioner on the ground of actual innocence. 
The Friedman decision represents a critical step forward in 
habeas jurisprudence to address the persistent problem of 
wrongful convictions. The call for a reinvestigation represents a 
creative and prudent way for habeas courts to balance the 
 
on why a reinvestigation was justified even though Jesse had pled guilty. It 
reasoned that Jesse was pressured to plead guilty and was thus deprived of a 
chance to challenge the evidence against him. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 
142, 158 (2d Cir. 2010). However, the court‟s further reasoning that this case 
was more troubling than a jury trial case where the court could take 
“comfort” in the jury verdict, was nearly non-sensical and certainly illogical. 
Id. at 158. It is far more justified for any court to take comfort in those cases 
where the defendant has actually admitted to a crime rather than when a 
defendant is convicted after a trial. Further, the standard that the court used 
in Friedman applies equally to a case where there has been a jury verdict. A 
court cannot take comfort in a jury verdict, even after all of the constitutional 
process is afforded to the defendant, if there is “new and material” evidence 
discovered after the trial that establishes a “reasonable likelihood” of a 
wrongful conviction. That was the whole purpose of calling for a 
reinvestigation in Friedman. 
322. See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 158. 
323. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). 
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state‟s strong interest in finality against the need to right a 
potential injustice. Although the number of petitions that will 
present factual allegations sufficient to justify a call for a 
reinvestigation under the Friedman framework will be small, 
the existence of this new mechanism is an important safety 
valve to ensure that legitimate claims of actual innocence get 
the attention that they deserve. 
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